>>3334
>my pet rock with googly eyes has the same chance of thinking "I am in pain" or "I am suffering" as the non-sapients.
I don't disagree. My point was more that organisms which lack at least some degree of independent thought (rocks, trees, etc.) cannot be considered "animals" as such, and therefore, bringing them up is essentially pointless.
>Furthermore your position isn't clear whatsoever.
I guess that's true, actually; I should clarify.
>Are you trying to minimize pain or minimize suffering?
Pain is essentially a subcategory of suffering, so I suppose I'm trying to minimize avoidable suffering -- that is, suffering which the owner of a given animal could reasonably avoid.
>Are you trying to give certain species rights or certain responsibilities or both?
Being human as we are, we necessarily must focus on the human implications of ethics -- ethics from a primarily human perspective. As such, I suppose the only way to prove the necessity of basic animal rights would be first to define them (which I have essentially just done in the last point), and then to prove that humans have an implicit responsibility towards maintaining them, such that they contradict themselves if they fail to do so. Ideally, there would be an a priori argument in favour of avoiding making animals suffer past what is strictly necessary for agricultural/hunting reasons.
>Are exceptions being made for domestication we wouldn't make for slavery or murder?
I don't believe so, no. Slavery is only tenable if voluntary, and murder is treated as a serious violation of the NAP. Not only that, but torture is also generally treated as a felony. There is no inherent inconsistency here, as in the case of domestication, we cannot prove consent on part of the animal; ergo, we are forced to assume that the process is involuntary. Yet because it is a beneficial symbiosis -- shelter and food in exchange for labour -- it is reasonable to assume that only unnecessary cruelty to these animals would violate the NAP, as they lack the ability (plausibly even the capacity) to voice their distaste for their arrangement. Whilst one could make that same argument in favour of involuntary human slavery, I would argue that the fact that we *can* demonstrate consent (or the lack thereof) in the case of humans, would rule the practice out; whereas, with animals, this is admittedly not the case.
TL;DR, Involuntary human slavery is a violation of the NAP, since humans can indicate their level of consent; animals cannot, so involuntary domestication is not a violation of the NAP in itself.
I think the true way forward here, is to examine why we view humans in an inherently-ethical fashion; that is, why we feel the need to act morally towards them in the first place. Given that the average person would generally be hesitant to torture their fellow man, this would indicate a kind of in-group preference. Yet I wonder if there might not be more to it; it seems rather inconsistent to oppose the torture of humans, but be complicit in the torture of animals, especially as one could make the argument that humans "are" animals, albeit very evolved.
>What is the logical argument for considering 'human-like' behavior (which?) the basis for the applicability of the NAP?
By 'human-like' behaviour, I was referring chiefly to the capacity of some animals for empathy, learning, and loyalty. You can argue that, if both man and animal demonstrate these, they are no longer inherently 'human-like', but as I mentioned earlier, this is a fruitless argument, as all ethical questions posed by a human actor must necessarily pertain first and foremost to the human experience, precisely because we cannot ourselves imagine anything else, as such.
Furthermore, since the NAP is, ultimately, a human abstraction of a natural law, this means two things:
>Being natural in origin, it applies a priori to all things which meet its prerequisites;
>Being a human abstraction of a natural law, it is unconsciously designed to apply to human prerequisites.
Ergo, the NAP applies to every organism which displays human-like behaviour.