>>4546 >grenade launching

>>4548 that rifle made launcher seems like a good idea but wtf is the sturmpistol? was that shit actually used and is the effectiveness documented?

>>2079 80mm could definitely fuck most allied tanks if you hit the side, but that raises the question of how well it fired and if any malfunctions were common

>>2087 leave it to britbongs to leave the heart exposed

>>2096 WW2 nightvision has the best aesthetic

>>4554 Knee mortars were not actually fired from your knee and that's a good way to end up with a fucked leg.

>>2087 >aluminum armor

>>4551 Time consuming to get loaded and ready. Open rifled flare gun, insert the boom load through the muzzle, screw on the charge, close and bang.

>>2161 We are speaking about the US Navy, they had more than enough Essex-class carriers as it is. Building a few more Iowas and some Montanas wouln't have made any difference overall.

>>2195 >image didn't upload Here.

>>2195 >or 24in gunned (they skipped 20 and 22in) 'Virginia-class Ultra-Battleships' Do you know how many guns they wanted and in what configuration? And would it be comparable to a Tillman-battleship in size and tonnage, or significantly bigger? Although I guess they were still making sketches for different possible variants. >>4561 >3x4 18" >2x3 8" >8x3 6" >23x2 3" Do I remember correctly? Also, my autism really can't take the uneven number of AA mounts. I can't help myself but look at it and wish they brought up the number to 25 or even 30.

>>4562 >Do you know how many guns they wanted and in what configuration? You are correct when you say >Although I guess they were still making sketches for different possible variants. so it varies depending on the design. They hadn't even gotten far enough to begin making serious springstyles (late-stage design proposals). However, what seemed to be the most popular for the main battery was 4x2 24in (various calibers were being discussed), although there were 3x3 and the rare 4x3, and I recall reading that there was at least one overly optimistic engineer who submitted both a 4x4 and 6x3 design. I also recall reading that they had also been considering a mixed battery design of 2x3 24" and 2x3 16in/50 due to the sheer amount of time they believed it would take to reload the main battery (roughly 2.5 minutes, manually), although advances in automation reduced this to acceptable numbers by 1941 (roughly a minute). The parbuckling system they devised to sling around the ~12,000lb Super-Heavy AP shells that quickly was and is, in my opinion, nothing short of a marvel of engineering. The secondary batteries they were considering varied wildly. Some proposals had the centerline secondaries (as in that design posted), some preferred the broadside gun houses as seen on the rest of the US' Fast Battleships. Bores ranged from 8inRF to 6inDP to the early 5inAutos >And would it be comparable to a Tillman-battleship in size and tonnage, or significantly bigger? 'Significantly bigger.' The largest of the Maximum-Battleships was only 975ft long, 108ft beamed, and of 72,600 l.ts displacement. The Scheme 12b1 Super-Montana design up there was 1224ft long, 160ft beamed, and of 132,440 l.ts displacement. Larger than the Ford-class, in other words, and at the time would have been the largest ships in the world. The 'Virginia-class' Ultra-Battleships ranged from slightly larger than those to dwarfs the Knock Nevis/Seawise Giant. Now, I only mention it because it's worth a giggle, but the 6x3 battery is the example of the latter group - it had 4x3 8inRF centerline secondary mounts on top of it basically being a Super-NelRod with 24in guns. As a matter of fact, it would have dwarfed the mythical 'H45' design that the internet created (it wasn't actually the internet, it was cooked up in the 70s-80s, iirc) because they wanted to see the Heavy Gustavs on ships. The guy who proposed it would have been disregarded entirely as throwing hyperbole if he hadn't also proposed the method to actually build the things. Surprisingly a very well thought out method involving building the ship in multiple water-tight pieces on the slipways and then assembling it in a specially made floating drydock - since he correctly noted they'd be needing those anyway for any of the ships they were proposing. A majority of them ended up around the Knock Nevis/Seawise Giant's 1504ft length and around 200,000 l.ts displacement, which I admit is still absurdly large but as a NavEng anon, I can't help but let it get the old brain gears turning. >Do I remember correctly? 12-18in/48 Mark 1 (4x3), 6-8in/55 RF Mark 16 (2x3), 18-6/47 DP Mark 16 (8x3), 46-3in/50 AA Mark 22 (23x2), Misc. 20mm/70 Mark 4 in Mk24 Twin Mount (as desired, for anti-suicide craft work). For all worth, yes, you did. (Post war, the 3in Twin was referred to as the Mark 27) >Spoiler I honestly agree, and question the effectiveness of the bow mount. I cannot help but feel like it would have been deleted right after the shakedown cruise since it'd just spend forever washed out. While the 'full bow' of this design wouldn't create nearly such a wet forward as the Iowas' needle bow, it was still going to spend a lot of time submerged as it didn't really have enough flare to it for such a brick trying to push itself through the water... as the designers were obviously well aware considering they went full British with the number of breakwaters they included. Adding mounts would be problematic (there are no more locations they could due to blast effect), but removing that one would have made organization of the mounts a lot easier.

>>2222 >it had two 24" turrets on the same level, a third 24" turret in a superfiring position And looking at that picture I now realize that the Nelson-class has the middle turret in a superfiring position.

>>2222 >Could you tell us more about this? Not easily. It would be as hard as putting that video into words and only words. Without visuals, it's nearly impossible to do so in a way that would actually make any sense to someone who hasn't seen it (including schematics). >And how would it compare to the Yamato's system at a glance? The turrets were designed for off-turret 'reserve' shells, similar to the Yamato-class', but otherwise they were in effect massively scaled up versions of the NoCo/SoDak/Iowa type turrets... with massive, powered, rotating columns with winches and hydraulic rams built into them that the designers were trying to pass off as capstans; multiple independently rotating shell rings, some of them built into the ship instead of the turret; the aforementioned off-turret shell deck; and even more flash screening. If that seemed like word-soup to you as well, this is why I don't think I could tell more about the parbuckling system and have it make any sense. >(Layout of the 6x3 Virginia) Sort of yes, kind of no. Instead of actually using the Nelson-class layout doubled, they used the Type-A North Carolina-class proposal's layout design (only insofar as the main battery arrangement) and doubled that. Pic related. I brought up the Super-NelRod concept since that was a popular meme design that I believed would be easily picked up on. For clarity's sake, though, it was Deckmount 24", Overfiring (or 'Half-Superfiring') 24", Superfiring 24", Ultrafiring 8", Gigafiring 8", Amidships (with 6" broadside turrets), Gigafiring 8", Ultrafiring 8", Superfiring 24", Overfiring 24", Deckmount 24". Of these, only the 8in guns were 'stacked' (barrels over another turret), the rest were 'spaced'. It sounds absurd because it is absurd. It only was possible at all because the sheer amount of bulk held low on the ship (such as below deck armor) dragged the metacenter of gravity down to reasonable levels. >How would we build such a ship today? Do we have the drydocks? Assuming you're still referring to the 6x3 Virginia, it's still as unreasonable to build today as it was back then. Entirely possible, but unreasonable. We still do not have the floating drydocks which would be required to build such a thing - quite simply because there's never been any need for it, mankind has not yet attempted to build a >2000ft long ship. We certainly have the technology to build such a thing if we needed to, we did back then too - look up the Advanced Base Sectional Drydocks. There's just not been a need for it. >gates If you are meaning a slipway to build the entire ship on land in one go, the challenge isn't the floodgates, the challenge is finding enough level ground where you can cut a ~3300ft long ditch perpendicular to the shoreline and not have cut through protected land or a city. >I've read claims that by the end of the war the US Navy was started to abandon the Oerlikon in favour of the Bofors, and then the Bofors was still inferior the the Mark 27 due to the VT fuse. This is true. >then what's the point of going back to the Oerlikons? The Oerlikons weren't for anti-aircraft, they were for shooting at small suicide craft (boats) trying to make a run at the ship. BuShips was concerned about the high-speed suicide boats the Japanese had started to use at the end of the war, and had decided - since basically anyone could take a fishing boat (or, worse, a speedboat) and load it down with explosives - it was worth preparing countermeasures for. While they were confident that the 3in guns would make short work of a few such craft, they were hesitant to say that they could react fast enough if there were leakers, so they wanted at least a few 'light guns'. The Active Navy, however, were not so keen on the idea and didn't believe the light guns were of any benefit even under the circumstances that BuShips outlined. But come all these years later when the Navy actually started dealing with explosive-laden fishing boats, and the first thing they did was reach for Light Guns such as the M2HB and the 25mm Bushmaster.

>>4565 And I would forget the image, again.

>>2195 >>4563 Why isn't this common knowledge in naval circles? People always bring up the Tillman designs and the H proposals, yet even those look like toy boats now.

Does anyone have ballistic info/tests on the SSh-36 and stahlhelm. The former is rare to where it's almost memory-holed and all the stahlhelm tests I found on YouTube had them break at 9mm either due to a multitude of previous rounds or old age. Also since sloping is best for steel helmets why not just make a smaller version of the M1916 stahlhelm if not for the aesthetics.

>>2263 Is there a paper trail buried in an archive where all of this information is neatly organized, or are the pieces scattered in various out-of-reach places? >if the guns were that inaccurate IRL, they would have never been accepted past trials Do you mean those claims that an Iowa-class ship would struggle a target of its own size close to the maximum range of her own guns? >Drachinifel's absolutely retarded claim that the chambers behind the Iowas' rider plates (aka decapping plates) would flood if the ship was hi Not to defend him needlessly, but he's a civil engineer who works with whatever information is available to him. If somebody showed him a document stating that it was already flooded or filled with concrete, then he'd most likely correct himself.

>>4569 >struggle a target Maybe I shouldn't post in a sleep-deprived state. It should be read as struggle to hit a target, obviously.

>>4569 >(Paper Trail) All of this is in the archives if you know where to look and God favors you that day, but as anyone who has ever dealt with the US Military archives could easily tell you: the US Military does not organize anything at all, ever. Their perpetual state is chaos and that is the way they prefer their archives. In about 7 million unlabeled, dust covered boxes stored in about 50 different warehouses across the planet. >(Iowa Gun Accuracy) I was referring to in general, really. WoWS' inaccuracy with the USN guns comes from a failure of conversion. At the time of WW2, the US was the only major Navy that was reporting gunnery accuracy in maximum dispersion (2.5 Standard Deviations, 99.68%% of shells will fall within range given), everyone else of note was reporting in Standard Deviations (50% of shells will fall within range given). The USN wouldn't get with the program until on into the 1970s, which is why the modern 5in guns are 'magically' so much more accurate than the older ones - they aren't, they are just reported differently. However, Wargaming for whatever reason used the USN's reported numbers as if they were Standard Deviations and then increased those numbers to 'maximum deviation', which gave an ahistorically large number (comically still within the ballpark of the other factions' guns, though). But people still insist the 5in/38cal was a horrible anti-surface weapon because 'slow, floaty, inaccurate shotgun-like shells'... To your actual question, that claim stems from a report that actually did come from Annapolis and became codified in AMP Report No. 79.2R (SRG-P No. 48). While it gets blown out of proportion, the claim does have some basis in fact. That report in turn stemmed from an earlier report studying an Iowa vs. Bismarck scenario and they just extrapolated the numbers from there. Annapolis determined that vs. the Bismarck at top spot (using optics) range of 23,584yd/21,565m, Iowa had a ~7% chance of hitting vs. a broadsiding Bismarck; this was data was generated using practice shoots from the NoCo/SoDak class battleships' 16in/45cal Mark 6s, which the USN considered accurate stand ins for the Iowas' 16in/50cal Mark 7s. Vs. an Iowa-sized target, they estimated the chances of hitting: At 10kyd/9,144m: 32.7% vs Broadside, 22.3% vs End-On. At 20kyd/18,288m: 10.5% vs Broadside, 4.1% vs End-On. At 30kyd/27,432m: 2.7% vs Broadside, 1.4% vs End-On. The Kriegsmarine for their part, however, didn't think the Americans were very good at math. According to my notes, they - using the same exact data - determined that the USS Iowa shooting at the Tirpitz from 35,000yd/32,000m (which they were well aware was the Iowas' blindfire range) had a 1 in 11 (9.09%) chance of hitting with every shot when broadsiding and 1 in 23 (4.34%) when end on. Comparatively, they gave the Tirpitz a chance to hit of roughly 1/3rd of that and quite frankly didn't think their shells could penetrate the Iowa's armor anyway - note the disparity between the German figures and the American figures for ~30k yards. The Americans were absolute pessimists when it came to these types of figures. I got off on a tangent. My point is if someone wants to use the claims you mention, they have to realize that it applies to everyone else's guns - and missiles (the old system gives most AShMs a joke of a chance to hit) - equally. The US gave the British guns an even worse score, which rightfully pissed off a bunch of the crown's sailors. >If somebody showed him a document stating that it was already flooded or filled with concrete, then he'd most likely correct himself. In his video, he had up an image of the Iowa's armor scheme which clearly labeled the rider plate as a decapping plate. In fact, this (image 1) is the very image he had up. He continued to insist the rider plate did absolutely nothing. Which I believe came from one of Friedman's books, but I'm not sure - I've read too many books on the subject. Almost any of them would have brought up the water fill. This, combined with several other points has convinced me otherwise. Don't get me wrong, he's pretty solid when it comes to tactics and the ships of the Royal Navy, but he has a particularly strong bias against the US Navy including a very strong unfamiliarity with USN doctrine, and I don't think he's ever even touched a copy of The Influence of Sea Power upon History nor any of Mahan's later treatises - not that I can blame him, if you jewgle 'From the Sea' all you get is a music single. ...Unless he's changed tune over the last 2 or 3 years since I stopped paying attention to him, that is, I may have to give him a chance again sometime. Anyway, for fun, now that R.A.Landgraff has passed on and the Iowas are essentially fully off the reserve, since I posted tht old Image 1, Image 2 is a more accurate depiction of the Iowa-class' Armor scheme as they sit.

Why didn't they adopt this superior design?

>>2550 Fuck it, I'm writing a book anyway. One more thing, it's easy to misunderstand the accuracy data in my earlier post. Consider for a moment that both the Germans and the British strongly disagreed with the Americans. In fact, no other navy's data matched the Americans'. The Americans weren't magically the only one right, nor were they exactly wrong, their test was just considered ridiculous because they were asking for what everyone else considered absurd things. Namely: the target ship in the American tests was assumed to be performing extreme evasive maneuvering and rapid shifts in speed using reserve steam/overpressure and 'twist' turns. Everyone else's tests assumed the target ship was returning fire - which meant sailing in a mostly straight, predictable line. That's also something the Kriegsmarine lambasted the USN over: according to then-conventional wisdom, an evading ship was not a shooting ship. It's not something that gets thought about often today because people tend to think of the US Fast Battleships (NoCos/SoDaks/Iowas) as the 'standard' of battleships - after all, they are the ones they can easily go look up information on, they still exist after all. But in reality, they were 'the exceptional'. Life and operations on other battleships (aside from Jean Bart and Vanguard, but they don't count) were nowhere near as easy. No other battleships of the period were capable of maintaining 'lock' while maneuvering, let alone performing evasive action. The British and Germans kind of had it good in that they could sort of track targets with their KGVs/Bismarcks' central director while turning (the older USN battleships also fell into here), but they would still have to come to line in order to allow their guns to re-stabilize, acquire connection with the central director, and then aim - a process that could take upwards of 30 seconds on a good day, minutes in a bad one. Comparatively, the USS North Carolina during tests was tasked with performing extreme evasive maneuvers (read: crazy eights, clover wheels, 160 degree turns, 'full twists', and the whole nine yards) during rough conditions and the ship once never lost 'lock' on the target (obviously, when out of arc the 1 to 2 of the turrets couldn't fire, but at least one of the turrets was on-target at all times). No other Battleships could do that - especially not the Japanese - meaning that to return fire they would have to come to a predictable, steady course and maintain it for likely a good minute and change (Japanese upwards of 90 seconds). This, according to USN Doctrine, was asking to be murdered; but for everyone else it was standard operation. Now for the hilarious bit that throws mud on the USN's face and explains why this doctrine formed: The US honestly believed that the US was late to the game and was the last major navy to develop stabilized heavy batteries; they assumed that all enemy battleships would be performing extreme evasive maneuvering at all times while engaging, which gave them their unoptimistic view of accuracy and the figures given in the report. This of course also ignores the fact that only the USN Fast Battleships, the Bismarcks, and maybe the Richelieus could even attempt to pull off the extreme maneuvers they were assuming to begin with. Basically everyone else (correctly) thought that type of maneuvering would destroy the ship faster than the enemy could. The Iowas were the only Battleships actually built to do it intentionally, and even they took damage doing it. Note, technically this means the report was correct - in combat situations, an Iowa shooting at an Iowa would only have a joke of a chance of hitting, but shooting at a Yamato? Different story, you're looking at around a 10-25% chance to hit per shot (depending on if the Yamato was maneuvering or not, she wasn't exactly nimble) at 32-34k yards at a range where the Yamato is looking for a magic bullet with a <1% chance to hit (the Iowas's maximum dispersion was only 36% the size of the Yamato's, so consider the earlier 2.7% figure vs. the Iowas) if they take the time to aim - which the Iowas would punish them for. The Iowas were the most expensive battleships ever built, with the SoDaks and NoCos falling in the 4th and 5th positions (Richelieu is at #2 due to Jean Bart's protracted build time, Yamato is #3). The Americans got what they paid for, the Japanese didn't. Just to put some form of 'evidence' down, this image is a snippet from a report on the Iowas' 1980s reactivation accuracy (the graph it refers to at the end is unimportant). The improvements, while significant, were not so great as to let them be as bad as WoWS claims back in WW2, to go back to my point of common false information.

>>2656 It was literally looks. Its also why the NVA went with the M56 Stahlhelm instead of an ssh40/60, because they wanted a uniquely "German" look, while not offending their Soviet overlords and fellow satellites, and they wanted different looking dudes compared to the early West German border guard since they still used surplus stahlhelms.

>>2550 >Later, automated turret designs could theoretically make quad turrets work, if someone could find a practical use for them. Considering how far robotics have come, I imagine a modern battleship would have a fully-automated turret. If nothing else that would make it more expensive, and that means somebody can pocket more money. >Grand Union design (32-36in guns, it's just the Navy preempting any Senator that decides to be the modern Tillman) Did they came up with this idea right after the 24" designs, or a bit later when it looked like that they won't get the funding? >I could write a book on this, but character limits are making this complicated. Not to discourage you from posting here, but considering how successful those two books at Forgotten Weapons were, that might be a good idea actually. Just give it a somehow vague yet overly specific name (e.g. US Navy gunnery in the era of the Dreadnought and beyond) and just write down all of your thoughts in a relatively chronological order. >Once they have acquired the target, no navy other than the British would attempt to decrease range in a naval combat just to improve accuracy. Was it a sound decision on their part, or just that 300 years of tradition at work? >In fact, one of the Iowa captains actually told an Admiral to 'go fuck yourself' when he suggested closing in, and that was during shore bombardment against field artillery guns that had no chance of penetration at point blank range I take it happened in Korea. But I'm quite the autist, so please clarify it if he said that ad verbatim. Because it sounds like a great anecdote to prove this point. >Comparatively, the USS North Carolina during tests was tasked with performing extreme evasive maneuvers (read: crazy eights, clover wheels, 160 degree turns, 'full twists', and the whole nine yards) during rough conditions and the ship once never lost 'lock' on the target Was it due to the combination of both the radar and the stabilized guns? Or is it just the stabilization that matters this much? >The US honestly believed that the US was late to the game and was the last major navy to develop stabilized heavy batteries Sounds like pessimism combined with faulty intelligence. Did they find out about some experimental (or even just theoretical) technology and they panicked, so they went above and beyond, to the point that left everyone else well behind? > This of course also ignores the fact that only the USN Fast Battleships, the Bismarcks, and maybe the Richelieus could even attempt to pull off the extreme maneuvers they were assuming to begin with. Is it because they had the propulsion, and they were also sturdy enough not to fall to pieces during the first turn? Or am I misunderstanding something? >Yamato Actually, could I ask for your assessment of that ship? I mean, as far as I know it had some very innovative and good ideas (like the loading mechanisms of the main gun and the shape of the bow), but other parts were hopelessly behind the times (fire control and everything related to anti-air warfare). Was it a top-of-the-line 1930s ship that was hopelessly obsolete by the early 1940s, or was the US Navy so beyond everybody else that it would be a magnificent marvel of engineering by the standards of every other navy of the world? Although I guess the truth lies somewhere between those two, but I have no idea where exactly.

Also, just to recap: battleships with big guns didn't became obsolete during the Cold War, but the USSR was a land empire first and foremost, so they were happy to concentrate on the Afro-Eurasian landmass, and their Navy went for more asymmetric tactics and strategies focused on gigantic missiles and submarines. As such the US Navy had simply no need for battleships (other than shore bombardment), because the soviets had nothing on sea that would warrant 16" or bigger shells. They still wanted them just in case, but congress had a long-standing tradition of hating fun. Is this mostly correct? And something I'm not sure about: what was the supposed role of the Iowas during the Cold War? I think you wrote somewhere that they were reactivated as a response to the Kirov-class, but as far as I know those were mostly gigantic missile boats. Were the BBs meant to join carrier groups and protect them that way, or was the idea to use them like battlecruisers that would hunt down the Kirovs?

>>4575 >Considering how far robotics have come, I imagine a modern battleship would have a fully-automated turret. Theoretically speaking, yes, such things could be designed. I don't personally think fully automating the design is a wise choice, given the number of minute things that could go wrong, but it is entirely possible given modern technology and definitely sounds like something the Military-Congressional-Industrial-Complex would try. >Did they came up with this idea right after the 24" designs, or a bit later when it looked like that they won't get the funding? The Grand Unions were a result of the US Navy's in-house design exercises back in the day, where they tried to push what was possible with then-modern technology without regard to practicality. These design exercises were done in part to keep them from getting rusty and to hopefully push the envelope on naval architecture. That type of thing was, of course, canceled by Congress as a 'wasteful expense' because 'the commercial market could do it better'. That and closing the State Shipyards were probably the two most major things which killed the US Navy from an industrial standpoint. Tactical and doctrinal is another story. >Was it a sound decision on their part, or just that 300 years of tradition at work? I would honestly say it was a sound decision backed up by tactical and strategic realities of fighting on the North Sea. Since they didn't have the advantage of vertically stable guns, long range gunnery was basically impossible to conduct in the harsh north-sea weather; so getting in the enemy's face was basically the only practical way of engaging. As a result, their Battleships were generally some of the best 'White Water' Battleships ever designed, but they fell short on 'Blue Water' and everyone aboard would get seasick due to how aggressively the ship would attempt to correct the open ocean's calm and gentle rolls. Comparatively, the Iowas were poor White Water Battleships - where they would try to become submarines - but on Blue Water handled absolutely superior to the nearest RN Battleship, what with their long, calm, and stable (meaning highly predictable) rocking with the waves. It really depended on where the ships were designed to fight and what they were designed to do. >I take it happened in Korea. But I'm quite the autist, so please clarify it if he said that ad verbatim. I believe it actually happened off Iwo Jima, although I'm not entirely certain what landing it was. I know it was a WW2 event, at the least; by Korea most of the BB Captains were being extremely aggressive with their ships as if they had a point to prove, which got the Iowa, New Jersey, and Wisconsin hit by 6in shellfire, costing lives. And yes, the Captain literally told the Admiral "With all due respect, sir, go fuck yourself." To further show how deep the resistance to breaking range ran, despite losing the argument the Captain was not punished for insubordination. >Was it due to the combination of both the radar and the stabilized guns? It was a combination of the stabilized guns and having a fire control system designed from the onset to handle and keep up with it. The Radar was just a component of the whole and no more important than any of the other parts, including the Optics. >Did they find out about some experimental (or even just theoretical) technology and they panicked... As far as I know, that one was actually just their institutional pessimism at work. Of course, back then they viewed their own pessimistic outlook as a challenge and threw everything that had at overcoming that perceived challenge. So, in a sense, it was less pessimism and more an internal systematic form of combating institutional complacency. But that also led into things such as the Alaskas, which were solutions that had no actual problems to solve. >Or am I misunderstanding something? Their various propulsion systems could handle that type of operation (the Bismarcks' diesels gave near instant response to power shifts and the American/French heavy powerplants could employ reserve steam and overpressure effect to massively decrease the response time at the cost of slowly melting the boilers) and their steering systems and aftquarters were designed sufficiently strong. So, you were understanding correctly. >could I ask for your assessment of that ship? (Yamato) The truth lies somewhere between the two, yes. The Yamatos were really fine ships, easily marvels of engineering the world over, and the Japanese put a lot of attention into fine details that even left the US Navy lamenting the lack of a chance to learn from them post-war; but the Japanese industrial/technological deficiencies virtually crippled the ships in crucial areas which made them drastically less effective than required. Despite downplaying them against the likes of the Iowas, I actually hold them to be easily one of the best Battleship designs actually built in history, if only they could have been taken as far as the designs deserved.

>>2828 Submarines already carry UAVs, Anon. Those literally are the scout aircraft of today.

I decided to stop being lazy and start making vids again, enjoy

>>2865 >It's the real future of warfare imo. If you have satellites, UAVs and no ROE, then why bother with anything else? Because UAVs are extremely easy to shoot down with HELs; you know, the things that every major military power on earth has been developing for 30+ years and are finally fielding working models. Additionally, every warfighter realizes that satellites would be the first thing to go for all sides in any war between major powers - even the US has plans to cause that to happen and the US is heavily reliant on satellites.

>>4580 Submarine-launched F-35 floatplanes with mirror instead of RAM coatings soon?

>>4581 Mirrors are still subject to the thermal effects of lasers, meaning they just melt. Mirrors defeating HELs has always been a meme. Speaking of HELs and memes, Fog/Smoke/Mist/Spray as HEL counters are also memes. Aside from just ramming your head into it with more raw power (at some point the medium is going to become saturated with energy and allow pass through), applying the correct forms of frequency modulation basically defeats those types of wave attenuation outright. FIRESTRIKE has demonstrated the ability to cut through storm clouds, which is basically the single worst mix of natural phenomena to a laser, by use of this technique - and the FIRESTRIKE used was just one of the 15kW modular units, not the upper potential of FIRESTORM (megawatt version of FIRESTRIKE). That being said, why the fuck would you want the F-35 as your aircraft? Even Lockheed Martin hates the damned thing.

>>2873 Not in volumes practical for aircraft. Theoretically could be used against the lower ends of HELs on ground vehicles, but on aircraft you're talking about a flying boat at minimum, which defeats the purpose. There are effective countermeasures against lasers, they're just not even remotely cheap.

>>4579 We'll, rest in pieces my porr speakers, otherwise enjoyed.

>>2920 >Can the Mountain RCS trick mentioned in 2756 be applied to aircraft too in some fashion? No, Anti-Air missiles have different targeting priorities than an Anti-Ship missile, which make that essentially impossible. Furthermore, there are no flying islands in real life, so simply detecting open air under the potential target would reveal it as a large flying machine, and if IFF failed then it's a valid target.

>>2756 >Incidentally, they also told me that their long-range AShMs couldn't even target the Iowas because the Iowas' RCS was so large and indistinct that it was effectively identical to that of an island or glacier So carriers with their high sides and flat surfaces are distinct enough from islands and glaciers and so you can program the missiles to target them?

>>4585 What about blip enhancement jamming to confuse radar guided missiles into detonating earlier than they should? Is that possible?

>>2967 >Could you tell us more about these designs? By the time you've reached the 6x3 Super-Virginia, everything beyond that stops seeming as notable in the department of craziness. The Grand Unions themselves were a later development than the 24" designs, but the term was retroactively applied to the various 30+ inch bore Battleships that they designed over the years. The only thing particularly notable about the earlier designs that wasn't just their sheer bulk or ever-increasing technological evolution of their components is that a majority of their 36in 'guns' were armored missile launchers in everything but name; but that's not exactly a crazy concept for the time period just before SSBs became practical. As for later designs, I haven't actually seen the modern Grand Union designs, sadly; I do know for certain that they had reverted to (smoothbore) naval cannon for them, however, as I have seen the turret designs. Some of which were Three-Gun, and at least one of which was Four-Gun (all guns independent). I have no idea how they would manage to fit that Four-Gun design in an actual ship's hull, though, far too deep (tall) of a design unless you made a Battleship with the main deck at the height of the CVNs'. >Would you mind telling us about this story? Outside my field, so I cannot actually give any more information that you could find on the internet. Suffice to say, like the US Army, their initial problem after WW2 was that they got used to having allies. This let them specialize in certain areas and completely disregard other areas, at least in theory. This has bit them in the ass now that those allies are turning their backs on the weakened US, and the US has lost that valuable institutional knowledge and competency. Secondly, this specialization mentality - and the 'long running' (by modern mentality) cold war - led them to getting too used to fighting the same enemy, which decayed doctrinal flexibility. Thirdly, post-fall of the Soviets, the Peace Dividend effectively gutted the US Navy's limited remaining institutional knowledge, the training facilities, and the ability to in theory regain said knowledge; as well as maintaining the industrial capability to produce the various equipment. Fourthly, the US rode that single-enemy specialization mentality right into shifting everything over to bomb goat herders in the sand box for 40 years, and have become complacent, forgetting the value of 'Next War-itus' (focus on the next major war). That's just my opinion, though; of course, this is all before the modern complete convergence. THAT is a fairly obvious story that doesn't need explaining. >I take it stopped being a sound decision later on, if even the Germans tried to keep their distance. In a way, yes, but in a way, no. They were just risking complete obsolescence and they knew it, they were aware of what the US was developing (even if they didn't have the details) and it caused them no end of turmoil; yet, as you mentioned, a majority of their Capital Fleet was veritably ancient by the late 1930s - all but the Nelsons being WW1-era designs - and with the new KGV designs, they made the strategic decision to design them for the same range and role. This allowed them to integrate their old and new ships in the same 'battle line' (as abstract as this was for the British during those times) without risk of exposing one or the other to vulnerable zones. However, they were gambling everything on the next war happening before the next 'dreadnought moment' happened. Well, their bet paid off. The next 'dreadnought moment' was Pearl Harbor which brought the rise of the Carrier (not actually what 'killed' the Battleship, mind you), and realistically speaking a majority of Battleship naval engagements during WW2 did happen at the ranges the Royal Navy had prepared for. >Vanguard Vanguard was essentially a wartime expedient Frankenstein's Monster of a warship constructed of (initially) whatever they had lying around and (later) whatever they could hobo the US into giving them (the Vanguard's gun stabilizers were practically US designed). I must say, they produced an absolutely splendid result considering what they had to work with.

>>2968 >Is it because Japanese didn't have the cruisers that would have warranted such a cruiser-killer? Or their tactics didn't make use of their cruisers in such a way that made these ships useful? In theory, it's because the Alaskas were designed to fight a Japanese 'Super-Cruiser' that ONI had made a faulty intel reading about (they mistranslated Shoukaku's name) and thought the Japanese could be building. Later, they discovered information on an actual Japanese Super-Cruiser design that - to them - validated their suspicions. Laughably, that Japanese Super-Cruiser was actually a response to the Alaskas. It never materialized beyond design stages, though. In practice, it's because by the time the Alaskas made it in theater, the Japanese barely had any cruisers (of any sort) left for them to shoot at. >That remind me of yet one more question: all these things about battleships, are they actually common knowledge in the navy? Or did too many of them grew up learning that carriers are the alpha and omega of modern naval combat? The latter. While this type of information was the scuttlebutt back pre-2000, and reverberations lasted until the death of the Naval Gunfire Support Debate, I personally doubt you could find 2000 souls in the current US Navy that knew half of this. >Also, a few years ago somebody posted that there was a Cold War wargame conducted by the US Navy where a modern battleship was fighting against a modern carrier group, and the battleship won most of the time simply because it had enough AA to just shoot down anything the carrier could threw at it. Is this more than a rumour? That's more than just rumor, I have read the (redacted/censored) documents on that wargame - if I'm thinking of the right one. If being completely honest, the Battleship's direct engagement victory (the BB won by 'sinking' the CV) was a result of the confines of the engagement zone, but considering victory conditions for the BB was to survive, I think they would have more than accomplished the requirements had the engagement zone been far larger. For another hilarious one, I've read reports on recent Navy computer simulations (for what those are worth) that pitted a hypothetical Flight III Iowa against an endlessly escalating number of Burkes. The Iowa was only sunk after sinking some 30 of them, and only because the ship had ran out of ammunition and fuel. They hadn't planned for it to last that long and hadn't given the Iowa any method of resupply. >That's quite shocking. Did they want to sell them finished battleships, plans to build them, or both? And what was their logic here? It's not like they needed battleships to fight Germany, and Japan wasn't a big enough threat to warrant a strong soviet navy. Was it something the Navy wanted, or it was the bright idea of some politicians or bureaucrats? Because if it's the later, then I seriously suspect that it's the work of communist infiltrators. Both. The logic was simply that the Soviets asked - Stalin was a fan of the big-gun ship, and had good relations with FDR. As for the source, well, McCarthy was right. >It makes me wonder if they ever seriously thought about building their own battleships. Although I guess they realized that the US would have started a program to build more and better battleships, so it was best not to try it. Still, it would be funny and terrifying if it turned out that they pulled a Yamato and there is a nuclear-powered battleship division hidden in the Arctic Sea. As far as I know, you are correct. I'm not allowed to say anymore. >>4586 >So carriers with their high sides and flat surfaces are distinct enough from islands and glaciers and so you can program the missiles to target them? Yes. From what I remember, the RCS of the Nimitz looks like a giant box wearing a tiny top hat. It's obviously not a perfect box and has a lot more 'sides', but is just blatantly an unnatural object. The Iowas, however, had gradually - but unevenly - rising returns that peaked in the middle exactly where a massive thermal return was being generated. In other words, the same as a volcanic island. >>4587 >What about blip enhancement jamming to confuse radar guided missiles into detonating earlier than they should? >Is that possible? Won't help. That's the oldest form of radar spoofing, even the Iowas had such spoofers during WW2, has too many counters today and basically every 'smart missile' and fighter's targeting systems have countermeasures for it by default.

>>2263 >or - worse - Drachinifel.

>>4590 As far as I understand, it's not that he wrong about every single thing he says, but he does make mistakes, and there is nobody in a similar position to refute him. So people keep parroting his words as if they were gospel.

>>3070 >So it had the same loading system as a turret armed with a gun, but instead of cannons it had tubes for launching missiles. They were mechanically closer to the twin-arm rail launchers than they were the 24in guns. There were actual gun variants of the design which did use basically larger Heavy Gustavs, however. >Were those existing missiles, or did they want to develop something new and exciting? They were 'new' missiles, but they were always a scaled down variant of an existing (or planned) missile - usually a land-based ballistic missile. Initially, for example, they were scaled down Redstone Missiles and then Pershing I/a/II missiles. Not as entertaining as entirely new designs, I admit. >I can't for my life figure out what this acronym is supposed to be. SSB technically stands for 'Fleet Submarine, Large', but is used as 'Submarine, Ballistic missile'. SSBs in the US Navy were the pre-nuclear SLBM (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile) launchers. >Was the US supportive in this, or was it more of a case of Churchill convincing Roosevelt that they need these new technologies, and then that lead the Oval Office arm-wrestling with the Navy? Initially, the US Navy loathed the Royal Navy, but by the end of the war had a firm working relationship bordering on brotherly with them. The suggestion of technology transfer of the stabilizers, for example, was actually the US Navy's suggestion, and the British were floored that the US just gave it to them when they originally asked to buy it. Guns, bolts, rivets, sheets of steel and such, though, were shamelessly hobo'd and I don't really think the Navy had an opinion beyond it being more lend lease. >Did somebody managed to mix up the string of kanji for aircraft carrier and cruiser? Although I guess they were only aware of the dimensions and displacement, because a cruiser that is bigger and heavier than the Dreadnought yet armed only with 2x8 5" guns sound a bit strange to me. They managed to mistranslate 'Shoukaku' as 'Kakeduru' or something equally crazy, couldn't find anything else about this 'kakeduru' (because it didn't exist), and ended up (incorrectly) piecing together random Japanese probing as a Japanese desire for a super-cruiser, and assumed 'kakeduru' must be it. They were unaware of what type of ship 'kakeduru' was, and just made assumptions. It's really one of the largest bungles of USN intelligence in history. >So, if e.g. China laid down some actually decent battleships today (let's just ignore all the practical problems involved with that), could you see them properly gauging the threat, or would it lead to a ˝pseudo-Dreadnought moment˝ of them not wanting to build battleships of their own as a response? 'Situation Yaoguai.' They've actually thought of this, but I don't know if the current US Navy would be capable or willing to stick with the plan. If they laid down said ships, and the US did have a firm grasp of what they were doing, the plan was to just accept that the 'Dreadnought Moment' they had been fearing for 30 years had finally happened respond by pulling out their archives and building a battleship of their own. Since China would be doing guess work on near everything, the US Navy was hedging on institutional theoretical knowhow giving the US a fast enough turn around time that the US' ship would enter service within months of the Chinese's. But as I said, I don't know if the current navy would stick with the plan. >So it tested 1vs1, then 1vs2, and so on, until it capped at 1vs30? I wonder what would have happened if it was a nuclear-powered BB with terminally guided shells for all of her guns. IIRC, it started out as a 1v4 and they kept adding from there in an endurance fight, ending with about 10 Burkes 'on the field'. The Iowa had sunk >30 of them before succumbing. >>4590 >(confused cat image in response to Drachinifel) >>4591 is correct, it's the fact a lot of people treat his videos like infallible gospel. I actually have a decent amount of respect for him, even if I stopped watching his videos, and he tends to do well when it comes to British tactics and doctrine. As I expressed earlier, he just has a really bad habit of assuming every navy followed British Doctrine and making some silly mistakes (decapping plate). 90% Truth is more dangerous than Half-Truths, since it's less likely that persons will go through the extra steps of doing the study themselves if they believe they have a condensed and reliable source, which is why I suggested his devotees could be worse.

>>2978 I like to think that there's all the /x/-tier shit inhabiting Siberia and that the oil spill was the result.

>>4592 >There were actual gun variants of the design which did use basically larger Heavy Gustavs, however. Did they plan to abandon the good old Welin breech and separate loading bags? Although I see no reason why would they do that. >They managed to mistranslate 'Shoukaku' as 'Kakeduru' or something equally crazy https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/%E7%BF%94#Japanese https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/%E9%B6%B4#Japanese So whoever was responsible for it went for the kun reading. The same reason 神風 is knows as kamikaze instead of shinpuu. I wonder how the US spy network was set up, because either somebody sent the wrong name to the HQ and then they distributed that; or the kanji arrived there, but the resident translator choose the wrong reading and that's the root of the problem. Still, I assume telegrams were involved, because those can't be used to send kanji, and this all could have been avoided if only they gave the kanji to the spies in Japan. Also, do you know anything interesting about that 8" gun from the 1970s? Was it a solid idea that they aborted due to a lack of funding, or more like a weapon of desperation that they developed only because they couldn't build battleships? In either case, it's strange they didn't try to resurrect it for the Zumwaits. They could be used to fore those extra long 155mm shells with the help of sabots.

>>3266 ebin facebook meme :DD upbooded :D

>>2137 >due to Japs going for Soviet instead of Western European+American owned clay in late 1941 This is a scenario I often hear people mention, Germany and Japan going for a pincer movement and attacking Russia on both sides, but I don't think it would have ever happened. From what I understand, the Japanese really didn't want to get involved in another war with Russia and they weren't such close allies with Germany that they would attack them just because Germany did. Also, even if they had been able to defeat the Soviets in the Pacific they still would have had to march across Siberia to do any major damage to the Russians and that seems like it would have been a nigh-impossible task for Japan at the time.

>>3318 >I didn't mention it, but both ends of the case are plugged. Now that is getting interesting. Then the chief difference between this and a ˝proper case˝ is that it doesn't expand (enough) to create a gas seal? >while the other end is plugged after the case is loaded. Is that to protect the powder bags and make sure that they don't fall out? And is it supposed to be simply blown out during firing, or something more interesting going on here? >more doughnut shaped than the marshmallows of the Iowas, really Cultural differences might be a problem here, so to make sure: by this you mean that there is a hole in the middle, and that they are not as long (or tall) as what Iowas had, right? I take the hole in the middle is to make them burn more even, but why are they shorter? >but you'd be losing a lot of the automation of the system True, but that also comes down to the difference between land and naval systems. I'd say on land reducing the number of crew required is much more important than increasing the RoF, so it would need a completely different automatic loading system that also fits into a reasonably sized chassis anyway. >with a dedicated (automatic) ammunition feed vehicle which automatically feeds shells into the main vehicle. Considering the size of a vehicle that would have to carry a gun that is longer than most tanks in service (or indeed, most tanks ever built), I think it would be big enough to have a replaceable magazine that is the size of a shipping container. Then you could use any of the trucks that is designed to haul them to bring it to the SPG, and then the truck could bring away the empty magazine. >At one point at least, the Air Force did throw around designs for a larger cousin of the AC-130 armed with 8in artillery. That sounds like they'd come up with during the Vietnam war. Was it the typical case of putting whatever old guns they had laying around onto a plane? I imagine they had some of them from all the scrapped heavy cruisers.

One of my favourite theories is that Hitler was baited into attacking the USSR by the British diplomatic corps and secret services. The main evidence is the flight of Heß to Britain: he honestly expected to find a strong anti-communist and anti-war group who would gladly partake in peace talks with him. And he was a core member of Hitler's circle, and Hitler himself wanted an alliance with Britain. Therefore it's possible that the Brits covertly but strongly suggested to Hitler and co that the British people would oust Churchill and join Germany in an anti-Bolshevik crusade if there was undeniable proof that Hitler wants to eliminate the USSR. So Hitler started Operation Barbarossa, expecting the UK to sue for peace and offer an alliance. But then that didn't come to be, and we all know what was the end result.

>>4597 >Then the chief difference between this and a ˝proper case˝ is that it doesn't expand (enough) to create a gas seal? Correct. The case was designed to survive through 60+ firings, which precludes it expanding. >by this you mean that there is a hole in the middle, and that they are not as long (or tall) as what Iowas had, right? Yes. >I take the hole in the middle is to make them burn more even, The hole slid over the primer tube. I forget what that type of primer system is called, but it was all a form of ensuring even and complete burn of the powder, so yes. >but why are they shorter? Weight. The Mk7's Powder Bags already weighed 110lbs (~50kg) individually, and these would each be much larger. The individual bags were thus made shorter to keep the weight roughly the same, even if it meant they had to move a lot more bags. This was part of why they went with the case system, since when it came to firing the gun they could just move the entire case through a rail system, which would then be passed off to whatever turret-side ready- reserve system that the design in question was using. >Is that to protect the powder bags and make sure that they don't fall out? Yes to both, it also serves to protect the more vulnerable end of the projectile from being damaged during the firing, as a lot of these larger shells were RAP, or even carried jet engines - later ramjets or scramjets - with some being guided projectiles. >And is it supposed to be simply blown out during firing, or something more interesting going on here? It's just blown out like any wad, plug, or spacer on more conventional cartridge or powder canister. >Considering the size of a vehicle that would have to carry a gun that is longer than most tanks in service (or indeed, most tanks ever built), A lot larger SPGs have been fielded or experimented with by the Soviets, such as the 2B1 Oka or the 2А3 Конденсатор 2P, which were 17in and 16in bore guns, respectively. While neither were exactly successful, an 8in/55cal SPG would be smaller than them and probably still afford space for automation. It would, of course, be quite a bit larger and less maneuverable than SPGs such as the M109 or PzH 2000. >I think it would be big enough to have a replaceable magazine that is the size of a shipping container. When you say 'shipping container', I automatically think of the large 54ft containers which are commonly carried by freight shipping (truck, train, and cargo ship). That is far larger than is practical for a SPG and would instead be a large siege gun for battalion or higher fire bases, which would require a fair deal of set up to use. Which, to be fair, would still be entirely viable. However, if you are going that far, it would be more practical to use a 9.4in(240mm) or 11in(280mm) gun instead. For modern purposes, Ramjet shells for such guns would still allow a long reach and effective payload within the confines of this thought exercise, and such a gun could still be transported in the size of a tractor-trailer/semi-truck. However, if you are referring to something more the size of what is in your second image (I must say, those are incredibly tiny containers for what I am used to), a dedicated ammo hauler vehicle would be a superior choice in all regards, and this a form of system that is commonly utilized already today. Such a vehicle would be specifically designed to go anywhere where the SPG could go, to keep up with the SPG, and generally be as protected as the SPG. A standard truck would have difficulty getting into the various positions that the SPGs would need to shoot from, and would definitely have trouble getting out of dodge when it came time to scoot. >That sounds like they'd come up with during the Vietnam war. Correct. >Was it the typical case of putting whatever old guns they had laying around onto a plane? I imagine they had some of them from all the scrapped heavy cruisers. The guns were M115 howitzers re-purposed for the role, they were not from heavy cruisers as those were far too large to be carried by aircraft of the time.

>>3408 Seems reasonable to me. Also of course the prevailing view at the time in both the German Leadership/High Command and in the world in general was that the Whermacht was unbeatable so the Soviets would inevitably fold meaning that the UK would scramble to get the face-saving alliance when the outcome was clear, probably if the deal was sweetened with the release of a suitably weakened France as well. To some degree that could even have worked if the Germans hadn't allied with the nips because the British would have then also have been free to go defend/retake the Asian colonies they'd lost but the alliance made it fairly obvious any peace deal would have to result in Japan getting to keep its gains. It's hard to offer the UK to retain its dominance of the Empire when half of it is in the hands of your allies who wouldn't have tolerated losing it again.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Haushofer >The influence of Haushofer on Nazi ideology is dramatized in the 1943 short documentary film, Plan for Destruction, which was nominated for an Academy Award. I recommend watching this ˝documentary˝: https://invidio.us/watch?v=ncLxx9QyHOY The war is far from over, yet the only thing it misses from the common narrative is that Hitler did it to turn all the jews into soapbars.

>>4600 >To some degree that could even have worked if the Germans hadn't allied with the nips because the British would have then also have been free to go defend/retake the Asian colonies they'd lost but the alliance made it fairly obvious any peace deal would have to result in Japan getting to keep its gains. If we want to go with some speculative history, Britain's best chance would have been a Japan first policy. After securing North Africa they'd just let the Germans and Russians slaughter each other, and get America to curbstomp Japan, while they support the nationalists in China. That would end up with the commies losing the civil war, and that would directly stop communist expansion in Asia. Meanwhile in Europe, with no Italian front, and with Italy staying in the war, the two sides would grind each other down, and then the Anglo-Saxons could get rid of either of them, or potentially both. In any case, I don't think half of Europe would end up in the hands of Stalin.

>>3523 In one sense, yes. A bit of inclement weather can easily be pierced by lasers with proper frequency management and more applied power. However, at higher air-energy saturation levels, you've created a plasma channel between the sky and your firing platform, requiring you to brace the system for regular lightning strikes during use. Easily doable, but it's even more weight and bulk in the end.

>>4603 I say all of that, but here hours later it occurred to me that Lasers absolutely would be shut down in a sand storm, whereas projectiles would still function. The downside of specializing on one field of warfare is that you tend to forget obvious things about other fields.

>>4134 Because they are basically worse Kongous. Neither powerful enough to sail with the capital fleet nor flexible enough to sail as flagships of a strike force - both things the Kongous could do. Japan had no need for surface commerce raiders in the vast reaches of the Pacific for the same reason they disregarded the Submarine Merchant Raiders - they knew very well they'd never be able to find the American fleets since, unlike the extreme range British fleets, the Americans would veer their convoys out into the middle of the ocean if that was what it took to get a clear path to their (heavily guarded) destinations. Convoy raiding by Japanese submarine was thus rather pathetic, overall, as they predicted it would be.

>>4528 >The only difference that would have been made is what Japan would look like today I don't see how changing the US's entry into the war changes the way Japan is viewed. Sure, perhaps the initial feelings might not be complete outrage barring your mention of a manufactured event but certainly this would change during/after the war. Afterall, WW2 was a massive propaganda war as well that convinced Americans who were war-weary to suddenly put everything they had against the axis powers. Japan would still be made out to be the evil, allying with Nazi Germany. You are also assuming that the oil embargo would still be remembered as the justification of war. It is practically presented today that the Europe theater starts with Germany eating up all the poor countries and Britain "saving" the day. We are still in the influence of that period. It will take hundreds of years before people can look at the war with impartiality like we do with say the Punic wars.

What went wrong?

>>4445 Seeing as how the Philippines was still and American colony it still would have drawn the US into the war, it just wouldn't have been the thunderous outpouring of war support Pearl Harbor brought out. You would have had loads of more conscientious objectors as no one would have wanted to die for the flips and Hitler could have easily said that it was a Japan/US affair and thus not taken the Allies bait to bring the US into the war. Thus, if Roosevelt would have declared war on Germany without a proper justification, the nation would have further split and the Republicans would have taken the White House in 44. There would have been some battles, the US still probably would have won most of them because the industrialists would not have missed a chance to profit off the war economy and thus would still have been outproducing Japan. The US would have chased them out of the Philippines and probably up to Okinawa before agreeing to a negotiated peace. Japan then turns it's focus to finishing off China, which becomes a three way clusterfuck between Mao, Chiang Kai-shek, and the Japanese. The US and Soviets keeping the two china's supplied with arms the entire time. >>4607 >Yugoslavia It would be easier to list what didn't go wrong.

If the Kriegsmarine had gone as far even as decided to pursue Diesel engines as the primary means of warship propulsion during the 1930s instead of steam turbines with high pressure boilers would it have changed anything?

If Franco backed Hitler between the fall of France and Operation Barbarossa, what would have changed? How much of an involvement could Franco make before pissing off his supporters? Assuming Spain took Gibraltar, could they have held it? Would the cost of the extension of Atlantic wall be justified by the extra troops available for the Eastern Front? If Gibraltar was held, how dominant would the Axis be in the Mediterranean? Could the Axis then take the Suez and completely shut the Allies out?

Have any of you read Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges by Kurt von Tippelskirch?

>>4610 >Spain joins the Axis after the fall of France, allows Germany+Italy to station troops on Spanish territory but does not send any regular troops of its own beyond Spain's borders >Germany also sends considerable amounts of machinery and other materiel to Spain in order to help them rebuild and bolster their economy >Franco somehow avoids getting couped by allied strawmen, Gibraltar falls >Safe supply line to the African continent established >Malta falls, mediterranean Royal Navy warships leave for the Suez >UK seizes the Canary Islands >U-boats and Kriegsmarine+Regia Marina capital ships are re-based in Gibraltar >Mussolini does not invade Greece, preferring to exploit the gains made in Africa instead >Rommel removes the undersupplied British from Egypt and captures the Suez canal in early 1941 >Greece and Yugoslavia join the Axis shortly afterwards >Iraq revolts against British rule, doesn't get shoah'd as Rommel is already aiding the Arab uprising in Palestine and Vichy-held Syria is too spooked to defy German military might, Cyprus also falls into Italian hands much to the chagrin of Greece while Mussolini sends reinforcements to Italian East Africa >The Vichy French fleet at Mers el-Kebir remains in Vichy hands >Churchill declares war on Evil France to save Good France from Fascism in Chad >the Luftwaffe which never suffered the losses it did during the BoB as it remained on the defensive during 1940 begins a strategic bombing campaign against an increasingly strained British homeland subsisting almost entirely on strictly rationed lend-lease goods due to gorillions of GRT sunk in the Atlantic >Portugal gets bullied into joining the Axis >the UK occupies Madeira, the Azores and Cape Verde islands >Japan obtains tank blueprints+parts, artillery pieces, aircraft engines, detailed after action reports from Fall Gelb and radar sets from Germoney through several Yanagi missions in exchange for a few seasoned naval engineers to help with the Graf Zeppelin and its future sister ships under construction in Italy >despite Italian incompetence and limited german babysitting Italian East Africa recovers slowly due to the crippling convoy losses sustained by the British on both ends of the African coastline >Turkey joins the Axis, opens the bosporus and lets Germans station troops on the southern edge of the Caucasus >Stalin originally wanted to watch capitalists tear each other to death until they were weak enough for a successful stab in the back by the might of the Red Army, but he might have to move up his plans a bit >Iran becomes increasingly spooked at the prospect of a three way clusterfuck between Angloos, Soviets and Germans on their territory >the British Raj, South Africa and Australia/Malaya/British Borneo are debating whether or not to cut their losses with the old Empire or face military annihilation/economic collapse, with the Asian colonies suggesting a lifting of the oil sanctions against Japan to at least keep the British Empire from falling apart completely >Hokushin-ron is reconsidered among Japanese military circles after successful operations with early german-licensed armor+tactics in China and german/italian submarines headed for Japanese ports starting to carry small amounts of light crude as a gesture of goodwill >Churchill is planning a last ditch invasion of Spain as the fuel-strapped RAF buckles under the strain of Luftwaffe attacks on radar stations and airfields >Franco begins to bolster the Wehrmacht in Europe with regular Spanish troops due to civilian sentiment having shifted in favor of war >FDR wonders what sort of false flag might get America on the war footing it needs to save the world Or >Spain joins the Axis >Franco gets couped and replaced with an Allied puppet assembly >civil war resumes but with a bit more direct foreign involvement >More Partisans than Tortillas in some regions

>>4612 The latter seems to be more likely, considering that Spain was fed by food shipments from the US.

>>4613 What would a Lusitania-tier American WW2 entry in the Atlantic prior to any Japanese action in the Pacific look like?

>>4612 >greece and yugoslavia join the axis Why? Greece was pro-anglo and Italy was far more interested in invading Yugoslavia than allying with it, not to mention anti-german sentiments in the Yugoslav military >>4614 In a best case scenario it would mean Japan gets out of WW2 mostly unscathed, since it never gets embargoed and the Chinese wouldn't receive allied support, and American enthusiasm for the war being low enough to trigger a post victory backlash that sees it go back into isolationism. Axis powers still lose, probably faster than they did OTL since no one is wasting time in the Pacific.

>>4825 >How many Scharnhorst-class ships could have the Germans built if they used all the effort spent on the Bismarck-class and the Graf Zeppelin to build more of these? I don't have the numbers on me, but from a rough guesstimate I would say if those three ships would never gotten as far as advance procurement, then the Germans could possibly have built four more of the (not really so) Ugly Sisters, but three more and change would have been more likely. >And would have it been possible to make an improved version... Possible, yes. Practical, no. You'd have an entirely new class of ship with different dimensions. It would not only be longer, but wider - you'd basically be spending as much as on Bismarck.

If Hitler let Petain's government administer all of metropolitan France save for the coasts because Atlantic wall after Fall Gelb would the French fleet still get Anglo'd at Mers el-Kebir and would French colonial troops in Africa be less inclined to switch sides come Operation Torch?

>>4825 The real answer is that they shouldn't have built any. All german naval investment that wasn't commerce raiders or submarines was driven by treaties requiring them to match %es in each class of ship with the rest of the world (i.e. the UK) just at a lower level. That is they had to spend the same % of their budget on cruisers as the UK had even if the overall budget was also capped lower.

>>4615 >In a best case scenario it would mean Japan gets out of WW2 mostly unscathed, since it never gets embargoed and the Chinese wouldn't receive allied support, and American enthusiasm for the war being low enough to trigger a post victory backlash that sees it go back into isolationism. Axis powers still lose, probably faster than they did OTL since no one is wasting time in the Pacific. The USA was inevitably heading for conflict with the nips. I don't think it'd delay that much further than a few decades. That and the Germany-Japanese alliance predates WW2 hostilities so you'd have to go further back than all that. Also burgers were backing China to fuck Japan regardless. >>4610 >If Franco backed Hitler between the fall of France and Operation Barbarossa, what would have changed? That depends on if the Battle of Britain goes down or not. Ironically the BoB, which was a guaranteed German loss for many reasons, actually gave the UK a huge morale boost locally and the look of not being likely to collapse in the international community. So if Spain joins and Gibraltar falls to the Germans + Spanish and nobody does something dumb like the BoB it'd probably push the UK out of the war on favourable terms (i.e. leave now and keep what's left of the empire). >If Gibraltar was held, how dominant would the Axis be in the Mediterranean? Could the Axis then take the Suez and completely shut the Allies out? Possibly. More likely it would result in a protracted siege and neither side holding it which is still overall a benefit to the Axis.

>>4831 >Would 5-6 upgunned boats have any noticeable impact on the Atlantic, compared to the historic reality of 2 not upgunned Scharnhorst and 2 Bismarcks? Marginal, at best. If deployed and utilized perfectly, they could have caused major embarrassment to the UK, perhaps even 'major' loss of shipping. But that'd have meant that someone other than the people in charge would have been in charge, and that would have meant an entirely different set of circumstances for Germany. >how did the Germans manage to replace triple 11" guns with twin 15" ones? This: >did they design the turret ring for twin 38cm guns and then downgraded to triple 28cm ones But not this: >because a quadruple was not an option? They 'downgraded' because treaty did not allow them 15in gun ships, but DID (via loophole) allow them 11in gun ships. It was basically the same thing the Japanese did with the Mogami-class. They designed the ships to upgun to and from very specific turrets from the onset, just to skirt under radar so to speak.

>>4620 >Marginal, at best. If deployed and utilized perfectly, they could have caused major embarrassment to the UK, perhaps even 'major' loss of shipping. But what about all the Allies ships that would have been kept ready just to deal with a potential attack from them? Wouldn't that force the Royal Navy to mostly abandon the Mediterranean?

>>4621 You'd have to crew and supply them which means you'd have less other ships and subs freeing up other assets. Naval logistics is a lot more than just building the ships.

>>4622 Feeding a few thousand people who just sit in a bunch of ships that are barely more than floating barracks doesn't sound like that great of a problem especially if it means that in turn the Brits will do the same thing with many more battleships that are going to be missed from other places. Consider the hundreds of thousands of troops in Norway waiting for an invasion that never came, but the other way around.

>>4623 You've also got to account for training the crew in the years before, getting all the original ammo and all that hassle along with the fact your manufacturing capacity (and steel) is used for it. Then if they're sitting stationary and it's the UK eventually you'll have to deal with potential air attacks and commando niggers. Also to be a real threat only sitting in port like that rather than sailing around raiding individually you'd need to have the support ships around that'd make it plausibly effective as a full fleet (more destroyers, cruisers) otherwise they'd obviously lose a full fleet engagement. But I suppose it would be cheaper if you literally only ever intended to use them as a fleet in being for a few years. Really you'd want to use them more like the Italians in the med if you could though. A mixture of sitting in port but being aggressive enough that you're still unpredictable. That's harder to do from the Baltic but it's plausible though in the hypothetical situation where the KM had more big surface ships going into the war the worldwide naval restrictions would have had to have been lifted far earlier which would mean the UK would have had more and more modern ships to counter them. That said Germany would always be far better off sticking all the steel, crew, training, fuel and manufacturing capability into smaller surface raiders and particularly into subs. The real damage they caused and the ships they diverted further away from anywhere useful would be more valuable.

>>4624 >That's harder to do from the Baltic but it's plausible though in the hypothetical situation where the KM had more big surface ships going into the war the worldwide naval restrictions would have had to have been lifted far earlier which would mean the UK would have had more and more modern ships to counter them. People usually say that they would worth it if the Germans weren't autistic and did the logical thing of pushing into the Middle East and North Africa, because the Brits couldn't stop Axis shipping in the Mediterranean if they keep most of their fleet at home to replay Jutland. >smaller surface raiders Drachinifel is quite right when he says that they should have used armed merchants for this job. Even more, they were building lots of cruise ships for the Kraft durch Freude, and that would have been a perfect cover for this build-up.

>>4617 Probably, if anything i'm surprised the vichy french had so much support

>>4825 >How many Scharnhorst-class ships could have the Germans built if they used all the effort spent on the Bismarck-class and the Graf Zeppelin to build more of these? Wouldn't happen, all the effort would be spent on Schwimms

Anons, help me out. What type of soviet uniform has like a short "poncho" looking overcoat? I see it flash here and there on rare occasion but I can never find it.

>>4628 Does it looks like this? This is private first class or what ever of NKVD

>>4629 No I mean like this type of thing.

>>4630 It's a rain cape "plash palatka"

>>4631 No not that one either. It's a shorter one like on the pic I posted.

>>4632 Sorry cannot find it.

>>4633 Yeah it's a tough one. I'm pretty sure the headgear was a pilotka.

>>4634 Sounds like border guard.

Interesting. Apart from plasch-palatka there seems to also have been a plasch-nakidka. Both seemingly come in varying lengths. I guess it must have been one of those after all. Also here's some unrelated photo I found.

Was having a traitor in charge of the Abwehr until July 1944 the single greatest failure of the German war effort?

Is it true that Germany kicked off WW2 ahead of their re-armament schedule? If so, how big of a difference would it have made it they hadn't fallen for the bait until they were properly prepared?

>>4637 They have bigger problems than the Abwehr, and the Abwehr was iirc, irrelevant in the grand scheme of things.

>>4639 I'm not an expert, but reading through a wiki page on him and the Abwehr, I am actually shocked that anyone put up with the bullshit from him and his branch. There are no scenarios in which an intelligence agency actively opposing and undermining your war effort and politics is "irrelevant". Even if they simply under perform, that's still devastating because you're still losing out on actually having functional intelligence gathering and counter espionage capabilities. Germany's military failures are probably mostly due to being utterly outclassed by perfidious albion's spooks. Probably more so than any other single reason.

>>4638 Yes, they were in middle of their re-armament program when the war started. As to how big of a difference it would have made, well the Soviets would have been in Berlin if they were given a two or three years after communist in Germany started their shitshow, supported by France, Great Britain, and to some extend power-tripping Polish leadership. It was fairly commonly believed that the communist in German society and military would have started causing a shitshow back in 1941 after the war with the Soviet Union started. Troops getting to see the wonders of communism first hand and telling what they saw to the civilian population fixed that problem quickly enough.

>>5400 >Malta was a particularly hilarious case. The bongs thought the island indefensible and therefore took it falling for granted while the Germans thought Malta an indestructible fortress that had to be navigated around. >If they had done even a little bit of recon, they could ave secured a safe supply route to the Afrikakorps which would have helped Rommel immensely. It also didn't help that the Germans refused to give the Italians sufficient fuel to properly operated in the med. The RM were by far the most competent branch of the Italian armed forces and taking Malta would have hinged on them anyway. >The overall lack of strategic planning in the OKH was at times truly baffling. >The same indecisiveness resulted in the strategic failure of Barbarossa in which none of the three strategic targets were achieved which ultimately led to Stalin's victory. In general the Prussian model was excellent tactically/operationally but poor strategically. That meant they consistently won battles but lost wars, at least against anyone who had staying power or who couldn't be defeated with a single decisive blow. >>4638 A delay until 1941 would have been even more useful for the Italians who frankly could have waited even as the war actually happened had Mussolini not been obsessed with winning his seat at the negotiation table which would have potentially provided a decent ally for once.

Was post-Munich agreement Czechoslovakia really so threatening to warrant a full on german occupation?

>>4643 No but the Sudetentland was.

>>4643 It had significant industrial capacity and after Munich and it didn't seem likely that it would put up much resistance, which are important factors. I don't think that was the reason though. From what I gathered, the government was still anti-reich, in some sense. Yes, it made many "friendly" moves, but more out of necessity than out of enthusiasm. They didn't really want to end the treaties with western allies and tried to declare neutrality for example. I guess you could say it was an ego thing, or something like that.

This is only tangentially related but what would have happened if America would have invaded the Soviet Union immediately after the end of the war like Patton wanted to do?

>>4646 I have no doubt the west would win eventually, but it would probably make the first invasion look like a joke, though it is also true that the soviets had manpower shortages towards the end of the war so maybe they would have given up sooner than expected. Germany would become a moonscape that's for sure.

>>4646 The USSR was by that point so heavily reliant on the USA for logistics that eventually they'd probably collapse in a war of attrition. However the allied ground forces in Europe would initially be horribly savaged and probably most other nations that weren't the UK would just stay out of it.

Why did the Japanese have so much trabu producing competitive aeroplane engines during WW2?

On Anons suggestion, we shift our discussion from https://smuglo.li/a/res/882346.html#q938714 to here. Pic related his post and here my response post: Mikasa is a non Character, has she ever voiced her own Opinion? The reason Eren does not want her to join remains unknown as of now. Armin is a Cuck who fell in love with a Women who killed his family. His talk talk nonsense is annying. If only his eyes weren't like the Ocean >Irl Germany TIKuck is a hack. His Battle series are good but his political videos are Garbage. He acts like he is the only one who knows the whole truths and only uses quotes which supports his claims. >by creating OKW Nonsense it was the direct continuation of the General Staff which was dissolved and forbidden after WW1. A supreme Command was always to be reestablished in the military plans. > creating the Waffen SS The ">Verfügungstruppe" was created to act against Internal enemy which the Army could not be trusted to go against fully committed i.e. Uprisings. Up until the War their Size was never a danger to the Army. The Waffen SS was created during the War and only grew considerably at the end >pre-war budgets that HEAVILY favored Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine Not true the Army always got the main budget. Keep in mind that the Navy and especially Luftwaffe had to be build from scratch so there may be some disproportional fundings as there was at least a basic Army already. >starting operations like Greece (and maybe even barb) Thats utter nonsense. Did he claim this? this directly contradicts some of his other videos. Greece was done because Italy was losing and there was the fear that the British would go in and threaten the Axis Balkan states >seen with the Putsch and all the shit Halder did before that There was no Putch but an assassination attempt but it became clear very fast that the Army as a whole did not support it. Halder was Hitlers choice in the first place. He pushed him and gave him his career. At least he stayed loyal during the War. Afterward he tried to wash himself clear and pushed the Hitler bad narrative. Also no Purge was specifically policy. The goal was to integrate ALL of society. There were like 20% Communist voters in the earl years. None were purged. Everyone was to be convinced of the new Government.

>>4650 Noice mate Let´s begin with TIK. While he is in fact a staunch follower of eloquent advanced fencesitting it´s good to know where his bias lies and it doesn´t disqualify him from making sound arguments. As he does with historical topics like you correct remarked and this one is. I will not defend him I just want to make clear where I got the initial idea from that gathered my interest and we can extrapolate what he says. With the sources, well doesn´t everybody do that? >Halder Got interned in a concentration camp after the failed 1944 coup because his 1938 plot for his own coup was uncovered. He was also part of another plot to arrest Hitler in 1939 and let´s not talk about the stuff he "reinterpreted" in preperation for barbarossa against clear orders. Halder may have been loyal on paper but that´s not an on/off switch. He used Hitlers goodwill to gain power and had no actual chance to turn because when the war started to fail hard he was already pensioned. Which leads us to Valkyrie: an attempt of the highest echelons of the army to seize power from the political leadership with special focus on getting command authority of Waffen SS. 5000 thousand people were shot and while that doesn´t seem much in the grand wehrmacht scheme it is an absolute point for my case when we see it in context of the 100k of the Reichswehr and their position. Because you know mate only they matter in a discussion about old entrenched power structers and new revolutionary ones and their conflicts. >general staff Was the OKH. The Luftwaffe was in it´s structure bound to support the army and navy decisions didn´t affect land. The only reason for the existence of OKW was as a counterweight. You got me with the budget but only because I misread millions and billions. Althougt the question remains why Germany geared 25% of it´s defence budget towards a force that was of lower importance and no, while technically the army existed, 100k men without any heavy weapons or vehicles isn´t an army in practical terms. >Operations All hearsay and Chuuni thoughts from me after I read an anon that said Greece was months away from joining the axis. >SS Now that´s the big one. Ask yourself why WaffenSS was given more and more priority despite dwindling recources and bleak prospect of the war. Germany isn´t the US that can afford to have redundant systems that compete for recources and the main reason to do this (avoiding interservice rivalries) wasn´t so much a thing as in other countries. Therefore we can deduct the only reason that´s left is an increasing amount of breath that Hitler has in his neck.

>>4651 Ok, lets keep TIK out. Like I said his videos about single battles are very detailed. But he gets agitated to quickly when it gets in other areas. And his Cocky attitude is hard to watch. >Halder Doesen't change the fact that he was handpicked by Hitler. As far as i know he was asked to paticipate in 1938 but declined. Since he wasn't executed in 1944 i would argue that they could not find any hard evidence. What he said after the war about this may also be put in question, as he may have tried to make himself look better as he had done for his military work. His work up to Barbarossa also seems to have been quite good. For Barbarossa, he as many others completely underestimated the red Army and the scope of the Operation. >Valkyrie But this was performed by a small group. Many of the Convicted were punished for being asked and not reporting this. The actual Traitors were few and not i the important positions, which is why it failed in the first place. Yes the Waffen SS grew considerably at the end. keep in Mind that about half of this were foreign volunteers which were not allowed to join the Wehrmacht. Thats one reason for the fast growing. But it remains that for the most part it was a small group who could not possibly oppose the army in a power struggle. But i do belive that hilter lost trust in the army after the coup attempt as shown in that he gave evermore to the SS (Himmler taking command over the reserve and later armygroup for example). We should consider that the disasters in Summer 1944 pretty much broke Hitler (Invasion, Coup, Bagration) >general staff I honestly fail to understand how the OKW would function as a counterweight. It could not give orders to OKH, OKL, and OKM. Can you elaborate on this? Also the OKW did coordinate between them (Weserübung for example), but each one had also their own tasks and operation (infamously Battle of Britain or Atlantic Battle). The Reichwehr had relatively large Stockpiles of basic equipment (Guns, MGs, Artillery...) and basic Infantery Divisions requires relativly small and cheap Equipment Tanks came later + the training of their soldiers were designed to quickly expand the army. Luftwaffe was nonexistant (Also Göring was in charge of the Budget so here is favoritism to see) Navy was completly outdated. Both are also more technical so more expensive. >Greece was months away from joining the axis Yeah it was axis friendly until Italy invaded. >SS Like i wrote above, as he grew more paranoic, he gave the SS more and more. But this happened in the late stages of the war, for the most part it was a small unit. They got preferential treatment because they performed well. The Army also had elite divisions who got preferential treatment (Großdeutschland, Brandenburg, 78. Sturm, Lehr Div, basically all Panzer divs). Again Hitler changed considerably at the end. To get to the Main point, i really don't see why Hitler would have to purge an army he himself build up and had 6 years time to replace unwanted personal. The army of 1939 is not the army of 1933 (you said yourself the Reishwehr wasn*t really an Army), i would agree that the Reichswehr would be sketchy but he had enough time and and did changed it to his wishes. Yes there were Generals who did not like him and disagreed with him, but thats the point. If you perform you could speak your mind. For example Guderian clashed often with him, but was later made chief of OKH (after a short break).

>>4555 >>4557 did shitposters really hate burgers this much in the war?

>>4653 I think this is Japanese Propaganda aimed at Australians.

>>4654 Was any of that in any way effective? not just the Japanese ones but any propaganda aimed at the other side, seems like a complete waste to me.

Regarding the matter of German armed forces, remember that one of the reasons behind the Night of the Long Knives was that the leadership of the SA wanted to abolish the Reichswehr and establish the SA as the new army of Germany. In response they were eliminated, the Reichswehr was turned into the Wehrmacht, and the SA existed until 1945 as an organization to be used by others for their own ends. I think it adds to the theory that Hitler had to balance the power of various factions. If I remember correctly he once said that he had a national socialist air force, a Christian navy, and a Prussian army. Pics are somehow related: the SA couldn't go into war in its own, but it could ˝sponsor˝ a division named Feldherrnhalle in 1943 and latter it was the main force of an army group also called Feldherrnhalle.

>>4656 And two more pictures.

>>4656 >>4657 Feldherrnhalle was basically the 60. Infantry Division reformed to Mechanized. The Name was mostly ceremonially, although they got reinforcement from the SA unit Feldherrnhalle. Keep in mind the Division s not the same as the "SA -Standarte" >one of the reasons behind the Night of the Long Knives was that the leadership of the SA wanted to abolish the Reichswehr and establish the SA as the new army of Germany We can agree that in the early years the Reichwehr could have been overthrown the Government so it had to be kept loyal. By the way it would have been stupid to make the SA the Army. If you compare it to the Red Army, it had plenty of conflict (Civil War , Polish War) to gain experience and an tradition. This would not have worked in Germany, a small country in the middle of Europe. Especially if you already have an small but highly professional army which could look back on a long Tradition (They kept basically everything from the Imperial Army). All of this was needed for quick expansion of the Army as it happened. I think the SA was just not needed anymore after Hitler came to Power. >If I remember correctly he once said that he had a national socialist air force, a Christian navy, and a Prussian army. I think it was national socialist Air Force, socialist (communist) Navy, and conservative Army >>4655 Depends on what you think s effective. The Germans had even in 1944 thousands of Russians switching sides, but this could have various reasons like hate of communism, conditions in Red army.. . For western allies not so much i would think and for Axis powers: its hard to convince them not to fight when at the same time you pulverize their hometowns.

>>4655 Propaganda can be very effective. The only reason Germany was able to invade Russia period was because of local support from rural Christian communities that had been abused by the godless Communists (a lesson a certain board fails to remember in their pagan LARPing). The Germans promised them religious freedom so they promised implicit support to helping the Germans get to Moscow.

>>4658 >but this could have various reasons like hate of communism, conditions in Red army A lifetime of that seems like a more plausible explanation than just reading some leaflets, from what i know at best they just amused some soldiers. >>4659 >Propaganda can be very effective. In general? sure, but specifically about trying to demoralized enemy front line soldiers i doubt it, it probably was way more effective to keep your people's morale rather than hurt the enemy's

>>4660 The hit pieces the Associated Press has run for the last year against Conservatives (and now covering up Biden's fuckups) directly disproves your point when they've been excellent at using propaganda to demoralize anyone who doesn't deepthroat Jewish dick.

>>4660 It's a double edged sword that doesn't leave a politically "neutral" group who don't give a fuck like modern lemmings on who's ruling so long as you leave them in peace. Back on topic, Operation Hannover is a complete meme and hilarious in shitshow because they threw away the number 1 rule of guerrilla warfare, never challenge a standing army out in the open who is ideologically dedicated and is still capable of operating.

>>4662 Also consider that with the Propaganda, the enemy has to react. He can ignore it and potentially risk negative effects or he has to put in some effort (collecting it, ban it , punishment) which could also cause some negative effects. At least it will cost him some resources. >Operation Hannover is a complete meme and hilarious in shitshow because they threw away the number 1 rule of guerrilla warfare, never challenge a standing army out in the open Operation Hannover was more of a operation against Paratroopers reinforced with Partisans as Partisans with Paratroopers. When it became clear that the Red Army could not break through and link up the Paras decided to fight (maybe they got an order?) and take command of the Partisans to maximize damage (maybe also because of an order)

>>4661 >Associated Press has run for the last year against Conservatives Are we talking about soldiers on the front line? i've never said that propaganda doesn't work full stop, my question is about propaganda specifically aimed at front-line soldiers, like leaflets and broadcast.

I think its highly situational. If your side is winning and you can convince the enemy that your arms are superior and treat Prisoners well it can have a huge impact. The british army had huge problems up to El alamain, namely that the average soldier just accepted the the German Army is better. Likewise how at the end many Wehrmacht soldiers tried everything to get into western captivity. If your side is loosing than obviously you have to focus your propaganda on your own troops. Also Its important to find the right angle, like the example above focusing on the resentments of the Australians to the US troops. Guess you can call it the art of propaganda. I believe this was studied by the CIA after the war and it became even more subtle then what was used in WW2 which by today seems very obvious

How (in)effective were the Waffen-SS?

>>4666 I've heard it was a pretty mixed bag, from some of the best to some of the worst.

>>4666 If you can't be bothered to read, then watch this: https://ytprivate.com/watch?v=w4RveXKfrIk But long story short, the Waffen SS was even more random than most regular armies when it came to the quality of their units, because it had everything from elite tank divisions to random foreigners equipped with whatever other units didn't need.

>>4666 >>4668 To clarify: the Heer also had this variety, but they had a wide breadth of average units with average results, so you mostly knew what to expect from them. The Waffen SS was a lot more hit-and-miss, but people only seem to remember the best moments of the toughest formations.

Would have it been possible for the Germans to simply surround Leningrad, build some very deep defensive lines around the city, and only keep enough forces in those lines to repel soviet forces trying to leave the city; and concentrate on pushing westward? A city full of civilians, but completely cut off from all reinforcements sounds like the kind of problem that will solve itself, especially if the soldiers trapped in the city get an order from comrade Stalin to break out at all costs, and so get slaughtered in pointless attacks.

>>4670 No, unless they can manage to convince finns of their plans and manage to take and hold lake ladoga.

>>4671 But that's what I'm speaking about. Reduce the number of soldiers directly sieging the city, and use those forces instead to push westward, so that the Russians can't just reinforce the city through the frozen lake.

>>4672 >>4670 That is what they should have done. The Germans had steamrolled quickly in their first year, especially in the open areas. The only way to "fix" Leningrad for the Germans is for them to have gone past it the moment they reached it as after winter the Russians had reinforced it far too much to be ignored when the Germans wanted to push another large offensive.

>>4673 Would have it also worked with Crimea? That is, block off the northern isthmus with static divisions, and instead drive toward Stalingrad and the Caucasus, then once they are in control of the Azov Sea they can also block off the Kerch strait, and then start attacking the peninsula.

>>4670 >westward >>4672 >westward Damn, it wasn't even that late when I wrote these posts, and yet I managed to fuck it up twice. Push eastward obviously, maybe to the point that the link between Arkhangelsk and Moscow is cut.

Was the decision to invade Norway prior to the eternal Anglo a mistake?

>>4676 If the Anglo-French forces manage to get into Sweden through Norway, then Germany will suddenly gain two allies, even if they are not the most willing. If they manage to knock out of France before the lack of Swedish ore becomes a problem, and the Norwegian-Swedish-German forces can put up a good enough defence, then I imagine that point the frogs and anglos would pull out of Scandinavia, and it becomes a great success for Germany. They don't have to station 200.000 soldiers in Norway, as Norwegians themselves would be up in arms, ready to defend their own coastline (with some German assistance), and Germany would have significantly more volunteers from those countries. On the other hand, Norwegians might not be that fond of the idea of Germans using their fjords as they see fit, but not being able to hide a battleship or two there is not the greatest tragedy if we compare what they gain. They might also be able to influence the 'merican public, if they can make them forget about Denmark and the Low Countries, so that Average Joe thinks that this is just one more European war that has nothing to do with him, not some ultimate fight between liberty and tyranny. But again, it's also possible that they lose Scandinavia, Denmark gets counter-invaded, and the war ends with an early German defeat. But that doesn't seem that likely to me.

>>4677 That is a nice fantasy, but not possible considering the lukewarm resistance of Norway against Allied(British) Aggression. Germany hadn't defeated France and was expecting a much longer battle, for that Germany needed Norwegian Iron to produce war material. There is also the fact that the Norwegian Royals were Pro Jew and Norwegian Ambassadors were hauling Jewisch Refugees into the country.

>>4678 Would southern Norwegian civilians and army regiments be willing to accept German "help" for resisting the traitorous Judeo-british Imperialists should Haakon VII cuck out and surrender? Would it make much of a tactical difference if the Anglos got to Narvik first?

>>4679 >Would southern Norwegian civilians and army regiments be willing to accept German "help" for resisting the traitorous Judeo-british Imperialists should Haakon VII cuck out and surrender? Difficult to say, the majority of Norwegian resistance was Cucks for the Norwegian Royals who fled to Britain for no reason. >Would it make much of a tactical difference if the Anglos got to Narvik first? They would be in range of most of Norways and Swedens iron mines at the time.

Was it an inside job?

what's the deal with the "Anti-Wehraboo" meme? i see a lot of fags complaining about people overplaying the effectiveness of the Wehrmacht and "Muh German Tanks", thing is these fags proceed to do the exact same thing by denying any sort of axis military accomplishmenta and assuring you that the axis forces were all de-facto mouthbreathers, and then jumping at anyone who dares to claim otherwise im bad at explaining shit so i added some screencaps of this type of retardation i really hate how much fucking propaganda has been festered about WW2 to the point where i don't even know where to go or what accounts to trust to know what the fuck actually happened and how could der unkel Adolph have actually won his crusade to unfuck the world

>>4682 >what's the deal with the "Anti-Wehraboo" meme? The power of the internet unravelled decades of one-sided propaganda (or more like two-sided if we remember that both sides used ww2 as part of their narrative during the Cold War), and now we have an unprecedented amount of people arguing about it everywhere, but mostly between people whose arguments are fuelled by feeling and ultimately lead nowhere. >i don't even know where to go or what accounts to trust to know what the fuck actually happened There are reputable historians who are only interested in the truth, and they are slowly working their way through everything that is publicly available. But most of the important stuff are buried in archives, and they aren't the kind of documents that simply tell you that everything we have ever known is wrong, and this is the ultimate truth. Instead it's about reading war diaries, reports, handbooks, and other such documents, and re-establishing the greater context piece-by-piece. It's a slow process, and we don't even know if we are at just the beginning, or if we have already went through a significant chunk of them. Also, many documents are still secret, e.g. the public is only about to get access to British secret documents from the very beginning of ww2. >and how could der unkel Adolph have actually won his crusade to unfuck the world You won't get a step-by-step guide for that, but the most likely answer is that attacking the USSR with Bongistan still in the fight was a fatal mistake. As I wrote before, I suspect bong diplomatic and secret services managed to convince Hitler and his inner circle that the average Englishman only hated two things in this world: communism, and the war against their fellow Aryans. So they fully expected the British people to oust Churchill and join them in the fight against Bolshevism if they prove that they really mean it. And we know how well that worked out.

>>4682 What germans did in WW2 isn't that weird or rare in history but because people don't know history they think Germany were doing something great and they try to undermine it because nazis not being the marvel villains with infinity soldiers is against their fiction based worldview. For the C**ST employee that is reading this post, i don't defend national socialis nor one of them. I just stated facts about the misinformation about WW2.

>>4682 It's the swing of the pendulum, tends to happen with that sort of issues, stuff get overplayed then underplayed and so on, something as controversial as ww2 will take a long time to reach a reasonable consensus. But we shouldn't forget either how recent internet purges have silenced the more wehrhaboo side of the internet while empowering the opposite.

>>4682 Also, those people in the replies are correct

>>4682 Schrödinger's baddy. They are out to conquer the whole world while menacingly laughing. But they are also inferior to ZOGbot Übermann heroes. What is to blame? Just look how much WW2 media has been astroturfed the last decade. If you're the average Anglosphere kid then you've played video game killing da ebil Nadzies and watched your favorite actor kill da ebil Nadzies, and obviously also consumed media where the ebil Nadzies won the war and turned the world into a dystopia! Let them fight the last war, they will get drafted and die somewhere in the Pacific.

>>4682 >anti-wheraboos It's because the wheraboos became a nucance to certain portion of the public with influence, and also simaltaneously decide to go off the deep end of sanity like 2020 Lin Wood/muh stop the steal tier. y. >>4687 >astroturfing Honestly, that is what actually got me to serriously review the American Civil War and the history on WW2 objectively and draw my own conclusions, so sometimes it backfires spectacularly. It is quite intresting how the nations pan out by 1939: >Krauts have good military doctrine, officers, lacking in resources, autistic kraut engineering still >French have shit for an armored force, wrong direction doctrinally, population demoralized >Soviets have probably the best doctrine, absolutely horrid officer corps and inititive >Burgers have everything but decent land doctrine, also muh supply lines >Japan on the verge of civil war again over IJN-IJA conflict with civvie liberals in the mix >China is a shithole but more manpower than zerg >Italy spent too much time fighting the Abyssinians to be of use >Poland still thinks they can pull a miracle at the Vistula >Bongs got a decent navy and thats about it just like US outsourcing to China >Sweeden poised to intervene in Finland possibly had the French/UK commenced R4.

>>4682 Just gonna drop this here.

If the Krauts close Gibraltar with Spanish help, successfully capture the Suez, set off an anti-Anglo Jihad in the Levant, capture Stalingrad and remove the Soviet Union from the war by early 1944 would they have the resources left to save Japan from unconditional surrender by churning out a fleet-in-being capable enough on paper to at least give the Allies reason to consider abandoning the invasion of the Japanese home Islands? Preferably so the Japanese Empire continues to exist postwar in a territorially reduced form without complete disarmament and no occupation of its political and legal system by burgers.

>>4690 Strelok, your scenario just ends with the nukes being dropped on Germany instead of Japan. Japan had zero hope of stopping the Americans when they decided the Japanese Empire was going to fall; not even a theoretical Super-Germany could have stopped that.

>>4690 Only 15% of the US' war production was tied down in the Pacific. It wouldn't be possible.

>>4692 Anon's impossible scenario would lead to huge allied casualties. So America would be hard pressed to push more troops on the European front or risk losing gains in the Pacific.

>>4693 The impossible scenario might lead to relatively less western front casualties with no Normany landings and most ground fighting happening between smaller concentrations of Allied and Axis troops in Africa after the Soviet Union's surrender, tough the Allies have the problem of being in a stalemate over western Europe in terms of airplanes but unable to contest regular Axis missile attacks on the UK. FDR was certainly bent on removing the Axis with no survivors, but I wonder if Truman's approval ratings could stomach Hitler ordering a reset of this twisted game by launching V2s carrying picrels filled with Sarin instead of Amatol at New York from submarines right on the eve of Operation Downfall, doubly so if it's in retaliation for a "war-ending" Allied nuclear strike in Europe.

I have a hard time believing that Roosevelt & co were such interdimensional shogi masters that they predicted how getting their old battleships sink at Pearl Harbor is the best idea ever, because aircraft are the future. However, it is quite obvious that they were preparing for a war against Japan that they wanted. Is it more realistic to say that they deliberately made Hawaii a naval base knowing that it might get attacked, but thought that it's fine, because even if they somehow lost everything they could just outbuild Japan; and the carriers being out at sea during the attack is just a matter of pure luck?

>>4695 Most of the USN's leadership didn't think the IJN could reach Hawaii without first taking the Philippines. Of the few who did, nobody thought they'd be able to sink battleships at anchor (Pearl Harbor was "too shallow for torpedoes" so surely a Taranto-style attack could never happen here).

>>4685 >long time to reach a reasonable consensus i don´t think this will ever happen, WW2 is a foundational myth, the entirety of the Cold War and as a result, the modern Pax Judaea we live in, is the result of the Axis defeat in WW2 if this narrative is contested in any way shape or form, it all collapses, they will never allow this to happen, in fact there is already a "Reasonable" consensus in the form of Leon Degrelle, who wrote extensive revisionist books on WW2, with the caveat that unlike most historians HE WAS THERE WHEN THOSE THINGS HAPPENED, and because of his peculiar position as both statesman and soldier you get a unique point of view that you can´t quite get from other war memoirs furthermore its getting worse lately, with the newfound "Myth of the clean Wehrmacht" maybe its an older thing, but i had never seen anyone blame the Wehrmacht or even German populace for the ebin nuhtzees, its probably just gonna get worse and worse with the orwellian twists like how the "Anti-Wehraboo" condemn Germany for warcrimes but then idolize bomber harris and downplay Dresden, or how many Anglo-Supremacists talk about "G*rms" and how versailles "Wasn´t enough" (check picrel, a bad example since its an old post from a shit place but still), this is only gonna get worse as the world gets more and more politicized and the modern world gets more and more out of control as the spiral of decay unravels faster and faster in a unrelated note, i read this on "Notes on the Third Reich, by J.Evola" his opinions aside, how feasable would it have been for Germany to go full eastwards?, no danzig or lebensraum memery, just trying to secure a bloc of nations to contest the Soviet Union akin to what the Kodoha wanted to do in Japan aganist the Soviets?

>>4698 >no danzig or lebensraum memery, just trying to secure a bloc of nations to contest the Soviet Union akin to what the Kodoha wanted to do in Japan aganist the Soviets? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cordon_sanitaire_(international_relations) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitteleuropa I'm too lazy to give you the rundown, but long story short if the Germans had a Bismarck-tier statesman they could have leveraged their position to become the big fish of Europe, and then use their position to fight a proxy war against the USSR. But they didn't have a leader with enough foresight to realized that you can't create an empire that is supposed to stand for a millennium in little over a decade.

>>4637 No... declaring war on the USA, after Japan failed to instead attack the USSR from the east was the greatest failure that cause some German generals to question Hitler's sanity.

>>4700 Indeed, can anyone give me a rational reason for Hitler to declare war on the USA to support Japan's insane baited attack on Hawaii? Especially after Japan failed in their main Axis commitment (attacking the USSR at the same time as Germany) and was still fighting in China? I can only conclude that by this point Hitler had completely lost his sanity.

>>4701 The only reasonable explanation is that he wanted to wage unlimited submarine warfare, and that would have lead to the US declaring war anyway, so he wanted to skip to the part where his submarines stop all shipping on the Atlantic. That didn't work, of course, but if it did then it would have been a logical move. The more I think about it, the more it looks like that German higher-ups were simply way too optimistic about every single thing, to the point of outright insanity. Just like how they thought that if bombing London didn't defeat Britain then some expensive fireworks in the form of the V-1 and V-2 will surely do the job, even though they already knew from their own experience that bombing population centres doesn't work, and they also woefully overestimated the potential of those weapons.

>>4702 A tragedy for humanity and life on earth. That said, if Hitler had not declared war on the USA (and Roosevelt was mostly forced to focus purely on Japan), would that have been enough to carve out some sort of victory in Europe?

>>4703 At that point every convoy through the Atlantic would have American merchantmen and US Navy ships mixed in, just waiting to be torpedo'd so that Roosevelt can declare war on them. Japan simply wasn't a big enough fish to keep the US busy for a whole world war, because most of their land forces were committed at China, and they had no hope of winning the naval war anyway. Even if we somehow still remove 'merica from the picture as an active participant, their industrial might would have been still enough to have a serious effects, and the strategic blunders the Germans made in the eastern front is an other can of worms. The only way for Germany to win is to fight a completely different war, i.e. play ball with Stalin until Britain is forced to sue for peace.

>>4704 >At that point every convoy through the Atlantic would have American merchantmen and US Navy ships mixed in, just waiting to be torpedo'd so that Roosevelt can declare war on them. Wasn't that the case even before? But the Germans went to the effort to avoid the WW1 mistake they made. I suppose what I'm saying is that would the extra year (or maybe 2) Japan would potentially buy for Germany enough to defeat the USSR before (likely) having to face the USA directly?

>>4705 >germany defeating the USSR The niggers couldn't run a train through a fucking desert, there would be bread riots before they got to moscow

>>4706 Maybe Germany should have just gone NK-mode and focused on propaganda, superweapons, and spycraft (surely staging coup d'etats in places like Norway and the Netherlands would have been more effective). Pride always comes before the fall.

>>4707 I mean, if Hitler had sided with Nat.China over Japan in 1936, the US probably would have remained amicable to them if not outright siding with them. It wasn't until that point that US general opinion began to shift away from Germany; and had that have happened, there was a slight (but extant) chance that Churchill would decide not to antagonize the Germans in his quest for a glorious war to revive Britain, instead choosing to go after the Soviets, whom he didn't like anyway. We could have seen a timeline where the Allied Powers were the Americans, Germans, and the British fighting the USSR; and instead of being nominally allied with the European-front's antagonized party, Japan would have been truly isolated facing these Allies since the chance of them putting aside their differences with the USSR was zero. But Mr. Mustache rolled the wrong dice.

>>4708 Hitler would not have sided with China ultimately. Germany had a handful of colonies in Asia that Japan snatched up during/after WWI, but the League of Nations soured Japan who was treated unfairly and so in return they treated their German colonies they had acquired with a lot of respect, and (retired or captured) German military command was treated with a lot of respect by Japan as tutors following the war. Hitler saw Japan as a rising superpower while he saw China as the same dying Empire it had been when the Germans had helped invade it thirty years prior.

>>4707 This is the sad reality of war: it is simply a means to an end, and preferably you should engineer such a situation that you don't even have to commit your forces for a real war, just roll in, do and take what you want, and then deal with the diplomatic consequences in such a fashion that everybody is cool with it. So basically what Hitler did in Czechoslovakia. Of course, it was more the Bri'ish and the frogs not wanting to fight a war that enabled Germany to do it so smoothly, and then everything went to hell for them when they changed their mind due to Poland.

>>4698 >i don´t think this will ever happen, WW2 is a foundational myth, the entirety of the Cold War and as a result, the modern Pax Judaea we live in, is the result of the Axis defeat in WW2 >this is only gonna get worse as the world gets more and more politicized and the modern world gets more and more out of control as the spiral of decay unravels faster and faster pretty much this. this whole mess we're in is a direct result of the liberalism/communism winning the two world wars, and monarchy/fascism going down in defeat. We're obviously living in a time of decadence, and I'm hoping the rotting structure of the postwar liberal order can be toppled sooner rather than later, so that it doesn't metastatize into something even more dystopian. speaking of Evola, a good quote from the Metaphysics of War: >With no significant political forces opposing the conversion of our world into a universal marketplace, the conflict of our time is the struggle to retain one’s humanity in an increasingly artificial world. That is the only battle that retains any genuine significance from a traditional perspective. >>4708 I'm thinking that the conventional wisdom is correct, and invading Russia and China were blunders for Germany and Japan, respectively. Of course, they would've had to come up with alternatives for resource grabs, but I'm sure there were alternatives to wasting their strength on projecting force into Asia.

>>4711 >they would've had to come up with alternatives for resource grabs You mean like having a functional economy instead of descending into socialism? >Evola Lol I've never read him is he always such a sore loser?

>>4711 I think that's a major oversimplification of ~80 years of history considering all the factions that go into it. I've heard more compelling arguments that the internet was the undoing of the world as was previously known because of how it decentralized and thus disharmonized human conscious experience. For fuck's sake America was going to forgive Japan and by proxy Germany for the shit they were doing until China opened their big mouths and had a shit fit. Gonna blame that one on da joos too, brah? That China and Saudi Arabia after WWII are the only reason the kikes are in control now is somehow also part of the Jews' plans?

>>4708 >I mean, if Hitler had sided with Nat.China over Japan in 1936, the US probably would have remained amicable to them if not outright siding with them. The USA didn't join the world wars because they had been attacked or because they cared about any of the atrocities going on, but simply because the US leadership saw the opportunity to remove the European and Asian Empires as the major powers of the world and install themselves as the worlds hegemon. There could have been a clean solution to WW1, with one side dominating the other and removing them from the game, but the USA prevented that with it's Leage of Nation bullshit, basically preventing the British and French to capitalize from their victory over Germany in any meaningful way. Equally Russia was allowed to not collapse and to morph into the Soviet Union. When Hiter managed to steamrole Europe to the surprise of everyone, he unmade decades of work the USA had done, by presenting the possibility of a German Hegemony over Europe and by that extent all the European colonies in the world. By the time Pearl Habor happened, it didn't matter if Hitler supported Japan or not, because the USA were already working hard to remove Germany as the leading country in Europe.

>>4713 yes, I was oversimplifying, but I wasn't wrong in broad strokes. >internet Decentralization of thought began with printing press & movable type, the precursor to internet 500+ years ago, which directly led to the Protestant Reformation. The information revolutions brought many good things, and are not necessarily responsible for the malaise we're living through. >Jews I don't really want to be anti-semitic, but there's no denying that they have a strong overlap with all the ills of Liberalism.

Why all British tanks start with a letter C ? Why Germans never put a 8,8 FLAK on one of their planes? Ein volk, ein reich, ein calliber. Why did Germany suck so much at technological colaboration? Wouldnt it be much better if Fiat was cranking out Panthers instead of L3 tankettes? Generally what the fuck was Italian command thinking ?

>>4716 >Why did Germany suck so much at technological colaboration? Wouldnt it be much better if Fiat was cranking out Panthers instead of L3 tankettes? When Hungary wanted to buy the license of the Panzer IV, they were only willing to give one for an early model with the short cannon, and only for a ridiculous price. They wanted vassals instead of allies, and so they wanted them to be reliant on German industry for everything.

>>4716 >Why Germans never put a 8,8 FLAK on one of their planes? It was tried in fact, they attempted to install a modified 8,8 on a Ju 88.

>>4714 >The USA didn't join the world wars because they had been attacked or because they cared about any of the atrocities going on, but simply because the US leadership saw the opportunity to remove the European and Asian Empires as the major powers of the world and install themselves as the worlds hegemon. Not exactly. Woodrow Wilson really got the ball rolling in WW1 in late 1916. HOWEVER, he was in favor of peace. He wanted to stop WW1 as quickly and as peacefully as possible because he knew in WW1 world white supremacy was at stake. He wanted to use America as the vehicle for a new, explicit global white supremacy, one without the old divisions of the past, the national and feudal divisions. He sought global white unity. The "self determination" of Wilson's proto-NATO League of Nations was ironically intended to dissolve nationalism. This was preparatory work for an EU. America would then protect the old white homeland while ensuring global white supremacy in a way that the ancient European nations could not because of their archaic contradictions. Wilson was kind of like a national-socialist. He felt white America was united at the turn of the 20th century after the Civil War and that the failure of reconstruction was a good thing because in it whites recognized the foolishness of killing each other over the negros. Wilson's attacks on Constitutional Originalism are based on transferring all power over to the then still hegemonic white majority and removing from power the humanist universalism in the Constitution that allowed blacks to claim to be part of humanity. We see the same thing being used for the exact opposite purpose today. Wilson grounded all these attacks in his own brand of Hegelianism. He was an ardent admirer of Hegel and to that extent was a German sympathizer. Wilson was also of course a Southerner and that is where the white racial unity connection really comes from. All of this failed terribly and WW1 ended in the worst possible way. Wilson could not secure peace in late 1916 because of the effects of unrestricted submarine warfare that the Germans did NOT allow during Verdun and which cost them that battle. If Germany had won Verdun and closed in on Paris the war would have been won. They cranked the submarines up afterward out of frustration and played right into the warhawks' hands. Everything after becomes inevitable. WW2 is really very derivative. WW1 was the real war. >When Hiter managed to steamrole Europe to the surprise of everyone, he unmade decades of work the USA had done, by presenting the possibility of a German Hegemony over Europe and by that extent all the European colonies in the world. Kaiser Wilhelm and the German Empire was already trying to do this. He originally wanted peace with Britain and Russia, and saw in the first Balkan war an opportunity to drive Islam completely out of Europe and beyond. Germany ended up allying with the Turks for purely tactical reasons. French perfidy and craven British imperial jealousy was what really caused WW1. I suppose you could say Germany was always trying to do this throughout history. It really goes back to the Roman Empire and the German thwarting and then subversion of said empire. Historically Germany represents the white racial unity while the Romans represented mongrelism and corruption, Britain and France being proxies of Rome since they were former conquered territories. Wilson recognized this. He was a massive history buff. >there could have been a clean solution to WW1. France and Britain were utterly exhausted by the end of 1917 and were combat incapable. They were only able to limp along during 1917 and afterward because of the massive influence of Wallstreet and American commodities, all of which had been flowing since 1915. The arrival of fresh American troops in 1918 is the only reason the allies won. The only clean victory would have been in late 1916. But by WW2 Wilson's white dreams were long since subverted by Wallstreet, Jews, Communists, and homegrown American liberal scum, New Dealers, though the same framework of banning Constitutional Originalism was adopted precisely to attack white America and which we see fully flowering today. Back in the day the blacks needed the Constitution's univeralism to protect them from a white majority. Now we need it to protect us from an anti-white majority.

>>4719 I would also add to my second paragraph that Wilson's League/NATO is now used precisely to exterminate white Europe instead of saving it, for exactly the same reasons and the same dynamic as his attack on Constitutional Originalism. The entire Wilson script was flipped.

>>4719 Collectivism over morality always has a cost in the end, trouble is if taken to the extreme it can bring about a fate worse than death and temporary advantage enough to do unspeakable horror (as seen with those in power of the world). That's the thing with the ends justifying the means, you always end up losing just as much in the long run, its the way god made this world. The only way to succeed in this life is through personal suffering of wit and will, trying to cheat always backfires on a long enough time scale. Its something european nobility at least at one time had some sense of, what with their "archaic contradictions", and the United States knew even better. Making others suffer instead of suffering yourself should only be done in worst case scenario, that's the thing evil fails to understand, moral relativism is just the symptom of human ignorance, yet it is always evil to never at least TRY to be better even if no other option presents itself towards you.

>>4721 /thread.

>>4721 Ok but that isn't really what the thread is about.

>>4723 NTA. I would dispute that claim. In the contexts of Wilson/Jew War I->(Roosevelt/Stalin/et al)/Jew War II->Usurper-in-Chief/Current Year~>(???)/Jew War III, it's entirely apropos. >tl;dr The West is coming to an end. Rejecting the Founding Fathers was the beginning of that end.

>>4724 And thank God for that. In the coming cataclysm, the Islamic State will finally cleanse the world from all that is evil, purifying with fire... from West to East, all tribes (and races), every descendant of Adam will have the chance to redeem himself before God or be destroyed and condemned to eternal suffering and humiliation. I know, you people can't believe it, well, I won't argue, just wait and see...

>>4725 >I know, you people can't believe it, well, I won't argue, just wait and see... Ehh, I know the Ishmaelites will play their part till the end of the age, since God promised Abraham regarding his firstborn. But the promised son was Isaac, not Ishmael. The legitimate children of Abraham, the (geneologically-pure) Israelis are the focal point of human history, according to God's timetable. Both Russia and China also have their part in the end of this age, Islamists won't wipe them out. And apparently Yurope is going to be a part of it as well. Not so sure about the Americas though. You terrorists may in fact be able to wipe them off -- especially the Jewnited Snakes. Regardless, America made the choice to turn away from their heritage -- indeed from God Himself in the ultimate sense. Don't be too proud of your 'civilizations' accomplishments if He uses you temporarily as a tool of judgement. You too, with face your own in the end. And you can bet it won't be according to the will of Allah or the Prophet! :^)

Would it have been possible for Japan to soft-vassalize the Republic of China as a great, loyal ally in the struggle to free Asians from vile western encroachment and bring forth an era of Co-prosperity under the gentle guiding hand of the Japanese Emperor and his military-industrial aides by backing the KMT in the 1920s instead of budding benis in Manchussy? Could an Axis with Nationalist China as a military ally or at least a source of resources have won the war?

>>4727 The KMT had large respect for Japan as most of their officers were Japanese-trained, and even Chiang would have pointed out that it wouldn't have really been possible at the time of Japan's occupation of China.

>>4727 >>4728 Why Hitler became no friendly with Chinese men no more while became friendly with Japan? Because they more white skin, smumairi, and homnoruable?

>>4729 Because China in the 1930s was an unstable shitshow in the middle of a civil land war in Asia, Chiang kai-Shek may have been sympathetic and well-intentioned to Hitler but Nationalist China was barely holding together whereas Japan was at least on a civilian scale internally stable, had the largest industry of any Asian polity at the time, a fleet able to seriously threaten the extant great naval powers in open battle, a highly educated populace and a goverment pursuing shared or at least similar geostrategic interests. 日清戦争は亜細亜の本当の大惨事なったかもしれん、支那事変がなくなったからノモンハン事件は戦争になったかもと米国は干渉する倫理由が少なくとも有りませんかも。 あの日々の極東ロシアは絶対に関東軍を勝つ事なかった、そうしてドイツ軍のバルバロッシャ攻撃が簡単に成ったでありました。 私の片言日本語を許してください、まだ勉強していますよ その日本式風の英言葉は目立つ、気を付けてください

>>4730 China was a good trading partner though were they not. Without the foresight of the army conceding to the navy and bitching out after Khaklin Gol I understand why Hitler would like an alliance since the state of the KMT was unstable but after Japan signed a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union what then. Two aesthetically and culturally agreeable countries with no actual support for each other or alliance, and it only damaged what peace offerings and enemies Hitler would have to deal with. If he thought Japan would've steamrolled China in their new war with them then without the foresight is understandable as the army and navy were in a passive-aggressive civil war. I think Japan was also baffled or offended by Hitler signing a non-aggression pact with the Soviets as well so they said fuck it and signed their own. Ties were close enough to China that even German officers were sent to train and educate the army and they also may have had the manpower so those two factors would've strengthened their position if Germany had believed in China. Also correct me if I'm wrong as well but the warlord era was practically over by the mid-30s with the communists being the only potential threat to the government. The whole betrayal seems it was done for emotional reasons with a heap of optimism that the two would shake hands in central Asia some years down the line. Your Japanese is also cute.

Was the Schnellbomber concept not as much of a meme as one might think? While its original iteration of "bomber too fast for interceptors" didn't survive beyond the BoB, the Ju-88, 188 and 288 are objectively among the most capable medium bombers of the war by virtue of speed and heavy fighter-esque agility if flight simulators are any indication. Even if it can't avoid interception a Ju 288 can still delay the arrival of enemy interceptors by accelerating in a shallow dive, and once an interceptor has reached it the plane can execute ACM with enough proficiency so as to not die right away like a fat fuck B-25 or the slow He-111. The Ju-88's many uses night fighters, reconnaissance planes and CAS craft as the war went on wouldn't have been possible with a conventional medium bomber airframe as its base after all. >tfw you will never live in a timeline where the germans had enough autism and materiel reserves to make the He-177 work as a naval recon/bomber, forcing the British to put disposable rocketplanes on cargo ships because lend-lease *cats don't have the climb rate for catching escaping He-177s at full throttle

bump

>>4732 Lets be real, what use is, say, single rear facing machinegun on Beafighter? How much weight can be saved by removing it, its operator and its slot, weight which can be used for fun stuff? On cas / torpedo / light bombers rear facing turrets are detriment if anything.

>>4734 >On cas / torpedo / light bombers rear facing turrets are detriment if anything. <What are Japanese fuel tanks You could sort of argue that for 7,92mm turrets but HMGs with 12mm+ greater API munitions are not to be underestimated, and even if the turret isn't the greatest defensive armament in direct combat having a guy in the back constantly scanning for threats is quite handy when your plane can't properly deal with fighters on its own. Also "light bombers" in WW2 occasionally were early war twin engine designs that couldn't hope to deal with monoplane fighters, removing turrets from those would've been even dumber. On a 1940s daytime fighter though their added weight has little to no purpose, hence the P-38 arguably being the best heavy fighter design of the war that could actually compete as a daytime fighter unlike the more specialized or non-daytime fighter Zerstörer fielded by everyone else.

>>4716 I know this post is nearly a year old but, the Brits split their tanks into two kinds. Infantry (infantry support) and cruiser (breakthrough tanks) all cruiser tanks started with the letter C (Crusader, Cromwell, Charioteer, Comet, the one exception being the Churchill). When they abandoned the infantry/cruiser divide after the war they just stuck with using C names to pay homage to the old tradition (Centurion, Challenger)