Which legal system was worse: Imperial Rome or Soviet Russia?
I've spent some time reading Evola this past year, and I can say that he's certainly more intelligent than the wignats who mindlessly put him on their reading lists. I think there is certainly room for a Traditionalist-libertarian synthesis, because Tradition(TM) is concerned primarily with the existential questions in politics, whereas libertarians are more concerned with the material-economic questions (although even from these disparate perspectives, Hoppe and Evola both approve of monarchy and aristocracy). The overlap, and thus the area where there would need to be some hashing out between the two, is ethical theory. Let me give one sketch towards agreement on that matter.
Ancap, that is, institutionalized non-aggression, is certainly compatible with Aryan ethical systems: Buddhism, Jainism, Stoicism, etc. In fact, the Jain maxim is "ahṃsa parmo dharma, dharm hṃsa tathaiv cha": nonviolence is the greatest duty, so too is all righteous violence [e.g. self-defense]. This is nearly synonymous with the non-aggression principle, anticipating de Boetie by at least a millennium. The difference is in attitude. We know that the main schools of ancap are utilitarian (non-aggressive societies would prosper materially), deontological (non-aggressive societies would be morally righteous), and dialectical (you cannot consistently argue against non-aggression). Here is Evola's commentary on Buddhist ahimsa:
>The fact is that this precept of not killing must be understood as having a particular interior and ascetic aim; and therefore, like all the others, it has only a conditioned value. Already on the plane of sīla [ethics] a certain impersonalization and universalization of the "I" is to be aimed at. When one has to do with other people one must try to anticipate the state of consciousness in which another person is felt as being oneself, not in the Christian, humanitarian, or democratic sense, however, but with reference to a superindividual consciousness. Seen from this height it becomes evident that "I" is one of the many forms that, in certain conditions, may variously clothe the extrasaṃsāric principle; a principle that may a ppear in the person of this or that being and there become manifest. We are dealing, then, with something very different from the respect of one "creature" for another "creature." The other "creature" is considered, instead, from a higher point of view, from the point of view of a "totality." This being so, it would obviously be abnormal to act or react against a part unless one felt oneself to be only a part.
<Doctrine of Awakening, p. 123
Here then is the synthesis: a non-aggressive society would be at least that Traditional(TM) insofar as non-aggression orients its citizens away from materialistic behavior, even if not necessarily towards the divine. Likewise, a Traditional(TM) society would be well-suited by a non-aggressive ethical code, since contemplation of the divine (or whatever you wish to call it) is severely impaired by violent behavior and inclinations to craving.
While I'm quoting DoA, here is another passage of interest to ancaps:
>As for "nobility," it is bound up here with aspiration toward superhumanly inspired liberty. ... "I serve no man, I have no need to serve any man" [Suttanipāta 1.2.8]; an idea that recalls the "autonomous and immaterial race," the race "without a king" (άβασίλευτος)—being itself kingly—a race that is also mentioned in the West.
<pp. 16-17
It seems to me that άβασίλευτος is synonymous with ἄναρχος, hence the interest to ancaps.